



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**WHY CULTURE MATTERS: AN EMPIRICALLY-BASED
PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING PROGRAM**

by

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September 2005

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE September 2005	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: Why Culture Matters: An Empirically-Based Pre-Deployment Training Program		5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Major Jennifer V. Chandler			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A		10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.			
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.		12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) As part of analyzing any dynamic situation or area in military operations, it is crucial to addresses how and why culture matters to the military. This thesis utilizes a systems approach for analyzing both the operational environment and culture, recommending an empirically-based pre-deployment training program that trains military members to operate at a higher level of effectiveness required for stability operations and today's "strategic sergeant" informational environment. A systems approach to analyzing the operational environment considers the current situation and the military mission in the context of geographic, societal, political, economic, military, paramilitary, security, and historical dynamics. This approach also analyzes culture through cross-cultural communications training. In order to align empirical and doctrinal analysis with operational realities, the thesis presents a pre-deployment framework and a tailored template for training at the basic, intermediate, and advanced levels. A systems approach towards culture and the operational environment, applied to pre-deployment training, and linked with long-term regional educational studies, and language proficiency, will improve the military's ability to operate successfully across the range of military missions.			
14. SUBJECT TERMS Culture, Pre-Deployment Training, Doctrine, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, Operational Environment, Stability Operations, Systems Theory, Military Training			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 105
16. PRICE CODE			
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18

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DEPLOYMENT TRAINING PROGRAM**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

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ABSTRACT

As part of analyzing any dynamic situation or area in military operations, it is crucial to addresses how and why culture matters to the military. This thesis utilizes a systems approach for analyzing both the operational environment and culture, recommending an empirically-based pre-deployment training program that trains military members to operate at a higher level of effectiveness required for stability operations and today's "strategic sergeant" informational environment. A systems approach to analyzing the operational environment considers the current situation and the military mission in the context of geographic, societal, political, economic, military, paramilitary, security, and historical dynamics. This approach also analyzes culture through cross-cultural communications training. In order to align empirical and doctrinal analysis with operational realities, the thesis presents a pre-deployment framework and a tailored template for training at the basic, intermediate, and advanced levels. A systems approach towards culture and the operational environment, applied to pre-deployment training, and linked with long-term regional educational studies, and language proficiency, will improve the military's ability to operate successfully across the range of military missions.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank the initial sponsors of this thesis, USMC's Training and Education Command and the Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning, for the opportunity to pursue the timely topic of "culture" and place it within the context of how to better analyze and train for military operations in a foreign country or region. In addition, I would like to thank the professors within the National Security Affairs (NSA) Department, at the Naval Postgraduate School, for their excellent instruction, knowledge, and guidance in their social science areas of expertise. I would also like to thank my thesis advisor, reader, and husband for their exceptional feedback and support in pursuing this non-traditional NSA Department topic.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND AND THESIS QUESTION

As urban operations after action reports, re-deployment surveys and interviews, and recent doctrine all allude to, it is important to train to the highest level of proficiency that is required for the environment a military member or unit will be operating in. Instances of stereotypes, racism, and abuse of power by military members have been reported in the media since the beginning of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) in 2003. There has also been an increase in journal articles discussing the ways military members have alienated the Iraqi population (ICG 2004; Putman 2004; Langewiesche 2004; McFarland 2005; McFate 2005, Scales 2005). Because of concerns the military, as a whole, is not prepared to operate extensively in Stability Operations (SO) type of environments, or conduct influence operations in a way that thoroughly understands “the other,” the DoD has recently made “cultural competence” a priority.¹ In response, many service and technical schools have begun to assess how they should include cultural awareness, regional studies, and language training into their long-term education and PME programs (Smith 2004; Klein 2004; TECOM 2004; TECOM 2005; McFate 2005; Scales 2005; Sargent 2005; McFarland 2005; ABCA 2005; Rader, Mitchell, and Dolan 2005; Carafano 2005).

What has been missing from the strategic and operational discussions of “why and how culture matters” is a look at the military’s pre-deployment training programs. Pre-deployment training programs traditionally have been the first exposure a military member receives towards orienting themselves to a foreign country or region. Typically the programs are conducted at a basic orientation or familiarization level over a one to five-day period. After the country orientation briefings, the military member might do some personal study and there may be some in-house training and very rudimentary, if any, language training. For many, after these orientation briefings, they are expected to operate in a foreign environment and help achieve mission success.

¹ Note: Joint doctrine is proposing to replace Military Operations Other Than War with SO. SO is one of the three types of joint operations categories--Homeland Security, SO, and Major Combat Operations, Draft JP 3.0. 2004.

The services currently utilize a variety of programs that only provide an orientation-level overview with some language and customs and courtesies mixed in. Only a couple of programs have detailed cross-cultural communications training. The programs tend to be at the basic knowledge level; which is adequate for traditional large-scale combat operations but not for the realities of today's military engagements where tactical decisions by an individual can have strategic consequences. The current training programs lack a detailed and flexible framework for analyzing the fluid and interdependent dynamics taking place in the range of SO missions. In addition, doctrine and the training programs do not have an empirically-based definition or conceptualization of culture (JP 3-07 1995; JP 2-01.3 2000; JP 3.0 2001; JP 5-00.1 2002; JP 3-07.1 2004; USA ITP 2004; TECOM/NPS TCMEF 2005; CCC RSEP 2005; CCMR LDSEP 2005).

This thesis argues the knowledge, attitudes, and skills required for SO requires a higher level of training and readiness than is currently being conducted. What should an empirically-based pre-deployment training program look like that incorporates the realities of stability operations, and defines, conceptualizes, and operationalizes “culture”? This question is complex because there are many aspects to understand before being able to provide a detailed framework and template for use in SO missions. In addition, the answer is embedded within a larger social science debate; as well as a military transformation issue that impacts doctrine, operations, intelligence, education, and manpower. In order to answer the question, it requires an understanding of how culture is defined and conceptualized within the social sciences; as well as a review and comparison of joint and service doctrine. In addition, it requires an understanding of how the military analyzes culture and the “battlespace” or the area in which the military is operating. It also requires a review of the current training programs and an understanding of educational theories and learning strategies.

B. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis recommends an empirically-based pre-deployment training program that trains to a higher level of learning. This thesis tackles why and how culture matters for the military. It lays the empirical foundations and utilizes a systems approach that

integrates several social science theories and disciplines, it is tied to military doctrine, it includes cross-cultural communications, the appropriate levels of learning, a multi-pronged learning strategy, and is tailored to the mission and audience. This pre-deployment framework and template will enable a greater in-depth knowledge of a country or region than is currently available in other pre-deployment training programs.

In order to provide an empirically-based pre-deployment framework and template, based on the operational environment and mission, tailored to any military audience, Chapter II will first discuss the theoretical social science debates about culture. This enables a conceptualization of culture as a system that can be utilized by the military. Chapter III will then address what is currently in joint and service doctrine, as well as current military-related proposals and research. This is followed by a discussion of what is missing and needs to be addressed before a framework and template can be provided. With the empirical foundations laid out, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the battlespace as a dynamic system. Chapter IV discusses educational levels of learning, appropriate learning strategies, and key considerations to keep in mind when designing a pre-deployment training program. Chapter V provides the details of the pre-deployment templates at the basic, intermediate, and advanced levels, which can be used for a variety of audiences, to better meet commanders' needs and the military's mission. The thesis concludes with some suggestions of areas for further research, recommendations to integrate the training program into the longer-term operational training and professional military education cycles, as well as ways to ensure the validity of the framework and template.

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II. THE SOCIAL SCIENCE DEBATE ON CULTURE

A. THE IMPORTANCE OF THEORY AND CULTURE

Why does theory matter and what are the main theoretical debates surrounding the concept of culture? In attempting to develop definitions, concepts, and a specific operational and tactical framework for analyzing culture and society during pre-deployment training, the military needs to know what is already available. The military does a disservice to itself if it does not go back to the foundational body of existing knowledge because the military will end up repeating mistakes or making decisions that are based on personal experience, preferences, or outdated doctrine and standard operating procedures. This means the military needs to have an empirical foundation upon which to analyze the decisions, actions, outcomes, and consequences that would impact mission accomplishment.

As social creatures, we are curious to understand why the world works as it does. Social scientists seek to find out if there are general rules or laws that can apply to understanding why humans do what they do and how the world is constructed. They also ask if the world can be understood only through our own subjective lenses, which are shaped by personal and societal experiences, or if there are less subjective methods and tools that can be used. Theoretically informed empirical analysis provides a conceptual lens through which we can understand the world around us. Theories provide explanatory power and influence or guide research; in addition they increase the body of existing knowledge. Theory cannot be definitely proven, only supported by a great deal of information or proven false (Salzman 2001; Lichbach and Zuckerman 2002). Both theories and facts are needed because theories without facts lack substance, and facts without theories are insignificant or fall into the category of opinion (Salzman 2001; Lichbach and Zuckerman 2002). Theory provides general trends that can be applied to many specific instances or particular cases. Theories can help answer likely questions about the probability of an outcome. Therefore, theory and understanding why the world works and why people do what they do is very relevant to the military.

Depending on the theory one ascribes to, it impacts the way culture is conceptualized and analyzed. The conceptualization of culture within the social sciences has tended to follow the evolution from biologically-based or socio-psychological theories, to rational-choice, to structural theories, to post-modernist and constructivist theories (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Kuper 1999; Monaghan and Just 2000; Salzman 2001; Lichbach and Zuckerman 2002; Wedeen 2002; Piombo 2004; Wiktorowicz 2004). When studying culture, social scientists either gravitate towards a single theory or take a more multi-theoretical, or at times, a multi-disciplined approach. For each social science discipline, the definitions of culture reflect the theoretical lens used to observe and analyze; which means there are many definitions and conceptualizations of what is culture.

The most common definitions of culture argue that culture consists of unconscious and/or conscious values, beliefs, perceptions, and behaviors (Weaver 2000). Some theories argue culture is either cognitive (such as, thoughts, values, beliefs, attitudes, and/or perceptions), behavioral (such as norms and actions), or a relational process (such as relationships or socialization); while other theories argue culture is a combination of these three dynamics. In addition, there are other theories that argue culture includes material constructs (such as social institutions and organizations). Overall, the differences in their theoretical definitions and conceptualizations tend to be over the appropriate scope or unit of analysis; what variables should be analyzed in attempting to describe culture; to what extent generalizations can be made about the interaction of these variables; and in how the variables influence and impact behavior, action, and outcomes. Typically the theories within these four areas lie on a continuum or consist of a range of differences. For example, a broad attempt to capture the diverse ways culture is classified can be found in the Random House Dictionary definition:

The quality in a person or society that arises from a concern for what is regarded as excellent in arts, letters, manners, scholarly pursuits. That which is excellent in the arts, manners, etc. A particular form or stage of civilization, as that of a certain nation or period. Development or improvement of the mind by education or training. The behaviors and

beliefs characteristic of a particular social, ethnic, or age group. The sum total ways of living built up by a group of human beings and transmitted from one generation to another. (Flexner 1993, 488)

Notice each of the definitions assume something different. One suggests a cognitive construct; while another assumes a behavioral process. Other definitions consider culture to be within the individual or between a group or even at the societal level. The last definition classifies culture as a total way of life.

The theoretical debates surrounding the scope or unit of analysis tend to argue that culture is found on a continuum from the micro-, to the meso-, to the macro-levels (Murphy 2001; Wiktorowicz 2004). In other words, the theories argue that culture is found either within an individual, among groups, or among/across nations.

At the micro-level, culture is typically considered either an innate biological function, or is a psychological trait of an individual which is reflected in an individual's attitudes and beliefs (Murphy 2001; Piombo 2004; Wiktorowicz 2004). Typically the micro-level theories are assessing internal and external cognitive dynamics. Examples of the micro-level unit of analysis are views by the British and French during their imperial eras, as well as the research highlighting ethnocentrism in academic thought and study. Both point to examples where Westerners sought to classify indigenous populations as primitive and backwards and their own culture as civilized and modern (Wolpert 2000; Tripp 2000; Macfie 2000; Monaghan and Just 2000; Murphy 2001; Dodge 2003; Roberts 2003). Another micro-level theory conceptualizes culture as a personality trait; and those traits are considered fairly set after childhood. An example of this can be seen in attempts by psychologist Sigmund Freud to describe dysfunctional personality traits as being rooted in childhood traumas (Murphy 2001). His work influenced other anthropologists of the time who believed in evolutionary stages of man's development and other socio-psychological theories that attempted to explain another culture (Murphy 2001). Another theory at this level looks at culture as a psychological orientation rather than a personality trait (Piombo 2004). In this case "culture" is an attitude towards social objects and institutions. An example of this is the notion that civic culture or society must be present in order for democratic systems to develop (Almond and Verba 1963).

At the meso-level, typically theories are concerned with describing culture as common norms, practices, or patterns of behavior. For example, anthropologist Margaret Mead defined culture as, “the total shared, learned behavior of a society or a subgroup” (Mead and Metraux 2000, 22). At this level, culture can also be thought of as either a behavioral or cognitive construct (Monaghan and Just 2000). For example, anthropologist Edward Tylor defined culture as a learned process, “that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society” (Salzman 2001, 72). Another theory that falls within the meso-level unit of analysis argues culture is defined by the institutions of a group, society, or nation that encompass similar cultural traits. Some proponents of this theory believe a person can shift traits or identities based on the environment they find themselves in (Johnston 1995; Piombo 2004). This would mean more of a causal relationship between culture and individuals, rather than some of the deterministic theories found at the micro-level. An example of this is anthropologist Franz Boas’ definition of culture as, “all the manifestations of social behavior of a community, the reactions of the individual as affected by the habits of the group in which he lives, and the product of human activities as determined by these habits” (Monaghan and Just 2000, 37).

At the macro-level, typically culture is described as a rational aggregate of decisions and actions that produce outcome between nations (Johnston 1995; Allison and Zelikow 1999; Lichbach and Zuckerman 2002; Wedeen 2002). One alternate theory that combines the meso- and macro-levels argues culture is a collective concept that provides a repertoire of actions and a range of what can be done by individuals within a society (Johnston 1995; Piombo 2004). For example, anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss provides a structural definition of culture,

Culture is neither natural nor artificial. It stems from neither genetics nor rational thought, for it is made up of rules of conduct, which were not invented and whose function is generally not understood by the people who obey them. Some of these rules are residues of traditions acquired in the different types of social structure through which...each human group has passed. Other rules have been consciously accepted or modified for the sake of specific goals (cited in Monaghan and Just 2000, 41).

Besides theoretical differences in defining the scope of culture, social science theories also vary in their attempts to measure culture, determine what variables to include, and in the types of generalizations that can be made at the individual, group, societal, and/or universal levels. When determining how to measure culture and articulate its variables, theoretical debates seek to answer the following questions: Is culture a cognitive process, or a behavioral or material construct? Is culture a whole entity or a sub-entity? If culture is the environment or a sub-entity, is it the primary influencing variable or is there a reciprocal relationship? Is culture dynamic or fairly consistent? Is culture diffuse and able to influence generations or other entities? The answers to each of these questions are important because it impacts the ability to analyze culture. Also notice how these questions are also linked to the scope or unit of analysis.

One example of the variables and generalizations that can be made is by anthropologist Geert Hofstede. He assumes a cognitive process that manifests itself at the meso-level when he defines culture as, “the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group from another” (Peace Corps Handbook 1997, 6). Social scientist Philip Salzman describes culture simply as a cognitive process at the macro-level, “Most broadly, everything learned as a member of society” (2001, 145). Another cognitive perspective, that combines the micro- and meso-level unit of analysis, is taken by linguist and psychologist Helen Spencer-Oatey (2000). She defined culture as a, “Fuzzy set of attitudes, beliefs, behavioural norms, and basic assumptions and values that are shared by a group of people, and that influence each member's behaviour and his/her interpretations of the ‘meaning’ of other people's behaviour” (Spencer-Oatey 2000, 4). However, anthropologist Ruth Benedict includes both cognitive processes and behavioral constructs in her definition of culture, “A culture...is a more or less consistent pattern of thought and action” (Salzman 2001, 72).

Non post-modernists would accuse post-modernists of treating culture as exceptional. This means many post-modernists are very inclusive about the number of variables yet exclusive when it comes to generalizations that can be made. Post-modernists would argue culture is constructed and practiced in everyday communications, as people interact with each other, therefore it is always changing. History is not necessarily a chronology of inevitable facts. Ideas, social norms, and social

identities, as well as expected behavior changes as they are influenced by the dynamic environment, events, institutions, and interactions with others (Murphy 2001; Piombo 2004). Post-modernists would argue that just by defining culture, we are automatically applying biases and stereotypes which will translate to the inability to effectively analyze a culture (Johnston 1995; Monaghan and Just 2000; Salzman 2001; Lichbach and Zuckerman 2002; Wedeen 2002). In addition, some would argue that we cannot define or measure culture in an empirical way because it is too personal, fluid, and dynamic (Johnston 1995; Monaghan and Just 2000; Salzman 2001; Lichbach and Zuckerman 2002; Wedeen 2002).

Anthropologist Clifford Geertz (2000) agrees that analysis of culture should be more descriptive or narrative in nature, rather than empirical. Geertz (2000) also took a multi-theoretical approach and argued culture should not be seen strictly as a concrete learned behavior, psychoanalytic phenomena, or symbolic system. Instead, culture should be considered a system, or as a set of control mechanisms governing behavior. Anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski took more of an integrated cognitive and behavioral approach, and included a material construct, when he defined culture as the “Integral whole consisting of implements and consumers’ good, of constitutional charters for the various social groupings, of human ideas and crafts, beliefs and customs” (Monaghan and Just 2000, 39). Anthropologist Robert Kohls took the multi-theoretical approach one step further when he argued

Culture is an integrated system of learned behavior patterns that are characteristic of the members of any given society. Culture refers to the total way of life for a particular group of people. It includes [what] a group of people thinks, says, does and makes—its customs, language, material artifacts and shared systems of attitudes and feelings (Peace Corps Handbook 1997, 18).

There are some pitfalls to be aware of when making sweeping generalizations about another culture. One concern is that if we treat culture as a “total way of life” how can we analyze it? For the military, this question is a crucial one to answer and will be discussed in the next section. Another pitfall is that some academics and military members have tried to reduce culture to a monolithic description, or assumed a set of static cognitive and behavioral traits about members of another society. In the end, they

misinterpret research or rely on single sources for information. For example, one service school taught excerpts from Patai's (2002) *An Arab Mind*, as the primary resource for understanding what is going on in the Middle East. Another example is the Air Force Chief of Staff's Recommended Reading List (2004). The reading list included Huntington's book, *Clash of Civilizations* (1996), without any supporting context or counter arguments. The book then becomes used by military members as a primary source to explain different "cultures" as the root cause for world conflict. Generalizations can also lead to misinterpretation of decisions and actions by applying generic stereotypes, ethnocentrism, and mirror-imaging (Macfie 2001; Klein 2004; Dahl 2004; TCMEF 2004; McFate 2005).

In addition to theoretical differences over scope, applicable variables, and the types of generalizations that can be made, social science theories differ over the impact culture has in regulating or influencing behavior, action, and outcome. For example, the dominant theoretical schools of thought in comparative politics, which are rational-choice, structure, and culture, each view culture's impact in a different way (Lichbach and Zuckerman 2002). Rational-choice, structure, and culture comparative political theories are representative of the debates going on within the other social science disciplines, such as anthropology and psychology, as well as sub-disciplines of political science, such as international relations and political economics (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Monaghan and Just 2000; Salzman 2001; Lichbach and Zuckerman 2002; Sue and Sue 2003; Wiktorowicz, 2004).

The rational-choice, structure, and culture schools have certain presuppositions about the way the world is constructed; and each school lends itself to a theory of social order such as strategies, symbols, or structures and how they define society (Lichbach and Zuckerman 2002). Rationalists study how actors employ reason to maximize their interests. Structuralists explore the structures, networks, and systems that influence or constrain man's actions. Unlike rationalists, they do not feel there are grand generalizations or trends that can be made. Structuralists feel there could be differences in initial conditions, institutions, structures, groups, as well as causes and consequences that produce dissimilar effects in different systems (Lichbach and Zuckerman 2002). Culturalists study the beliefs, rules, and norms that make up individual and group

identities. Die-hard culturalists feel each culture is unique and therefore every situation produces outcomes that are path-dependent and unpredictable. Many culturalists would argue only general comparisons can be made in order to establish differences (Lichbach and Zuckerman 2002). Notice how these theories tie back into the scope or unit of analysis, what variables can be used, and what generalizations can be made about culture.

Political scientist, Alistair Johnston (1995) provides an example of how the different schools of thought illustrate divergent views on culture's impact. Johnston (1995) takes a multi-theoretical approach that relies less on rational-choice when he discusses the conceptual and methodological concerns with studying strategic culture. Strategic culture is the decision making process and outcomes of the elite or of a state. For Johnston (1995), an understanding of another country's strategic culture is important because it provides our decision-makers with an ordered set of strategic choices from which predictions about behavior can be made. He says the notion of strategic culture can be viewed as a culmination of a wide range of potentially overlapping and competing variables that make it hard to empirically test. He argues that there are more than just *realpolitik* (rational-choice) or structural constraints at play, and that culture affects behavior by limiting options and affecting how members learn from interaction with the environment. In addition, another way culture impacts behavior and outcome is the construction of group identities, which can lead to various tensions (Johnston 1995).

Each school's particular philosophy and methodology is not without its drawbacks. Rationalists feel the cultural question does not matter. The issue of culture gets weeded out as individuals calculate and maximize their interests. This can lead to a rather mechanical-behavioral view of the world. Structuralists emphasize that it is the structures, organizations, or institutions, and not rational choices of the individuals or the individual or collective identities, which produces outcomes. Structuralists have often been blamed as being rather deterministic, as have rationalists. Culturalists face the opposite problem. Many culturalists have stated there are numerous variables impacting outcome, which makes it difficult, if not impossible, to test using typical social science tools. Rationalists also question the notion that culture, as norms and values or beliefs, produces outcomes. Lichbach sums up the inherent challenges with each theoretical

orientation when he said, “Rationalists can miss values and contexts, culturalists can miss choice and constraint, structuralists can miss action and orientation” (Lichbach and Zuckerman 2002, 258).

Overall, there are varying theoretical definitions and conceptualizations of culture that attempt to define the scope and unit of analysis, the variables that make up culture, what generalizations can be made, and disagreements over what impact culture has on action and outcome. Each theory has some explanatory power. Each also has conceptual, empirical, and theoretical limits (Lichbach and Zuckerman 2002; Wedeen 2002). Yet, how can social science theoretical debates about culture help the military in its attempts to define, conceptualize, and operationalize culture? At first glimpse, it seems the theoretical debates are not very encouraging if the military is looking for a concrete methodology to understand what culture is and how and why it matters. Let alone be able to integrate that concept into a framework for analyzing societal and national dynamics. The military cannot afford to completely follow single theories that view culture as exceptional or deterministic; because as one instrument of national power, it is required to operate in foreign environments in order to achieve and maintain our national security interests. Therefore it is crucial for the military to find a way to empirically, hence doctrinally, define and conceptualize culture. The next section discusses a way to tie in the theoretical debates and their differences using an approach that will meet the military’s operational needs, yet still be empirically-based.

B. A SOCIAL SCIENCE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF CULTURE FOR USE BY THE MILITARY

Given the differences of each theoretical school of thought, how are we to bridge the gap and apply social science theory to the military? The very debates going on for the past forty-plus years in the social sciences are the ones the U.S. military is now grappling with as it deals with transformation, conceptualization of threats, and how to respond. The debates over how states and populations think and behave are issues that are critical for the military to understand in order to accomplish its mission. The issue for the military is how to transform the social science debates into an integrated concept that allows for an analytical methodology and framework. The framework also has to aid in

the understanding of “the other” for a diverse military audience; as well as help in operationalizing culture, in order to achieve mission objectives. Several social scientists have integrated their definitional and methodological approaches to analyzing culture and society by using a multi-theoretical and multi-disciplinary framework (Tilly 1978; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Wedeen 2002; Dahl 2004; Wiktorowicz 2004). This section discusses four examples of a multi-theoretical and multi-disciplinary approach to the conceptualization of culture. Then, using those examples as a foundation, an empirically-based methodology and conceptualization of culture for use by the military will be discussed.

The first example is by social scientist Stephan Dahl (2004). In his research on the current state of intercultural knowledge, he attempts to conceptualize culture as

A shared set of basic assumptions and values, with resultant behavioural norms, attitudes and beliefs which manifest themselves in systems and institutions as well as behavioural patterns and non-behavioural items. There are various levels to culture, ranging from the easily observable outer layers (such as behavioural conventions) to the increasingly more difficult to grasp inner layers (such as assumptions and values). Culture is shared among members of one group or society, and has an interpretative function for the members of that group. Culture is situated between the human nature on the one hand and the individual personality on the other. Culture is not inheritable or genetic, but culture is learned. Although all members of a group or society share their culture, expressions of culture-resultant behaviour are modified by the individuals’ personality (Dahl 2004, 5-6).

Dahl’s definition recognizes the various units of analysis and how they influence one another. He acknowledges the interplay of cognitive, behavioral, and relational processes. In addition, he recognizes how these dynamics impact decisions, actions, institutions, and other material constructs; while also understanding how outcomes and material constructs impact the cognitive, behavioral, and relational processes (Dahl 2004). This is important for the military because traditional analytical templates have tended to be binary “either-or” categorizations that have not allowed for understanding the complex fluid dynamics on the ground.

The second example is by political scientist Lisa Wedeen (2002). She discusses the importance of attempting to conceptualize culture in a way that moves away from the

argument that culture does not matter because it is too difficult to empirically measure. She correctly argues that static or rigid categories or units of analysis (such as treating culture as a category of society just like the economy and politics; or stating culture is just a cognitive process of the beliefs, values, and customs of a specified group) do not allow for change over time, or for variations within the meso- or micro-levels. Rigid or static analysis can lead to the monolithic stereotypes that many social scientists hate. There is also the issue of how aspects of culture are interpreted which can potentially lead to faulty analysis and conclusions (Wadeen 2002; Smith 2004; McFate 2005; Scales 2005). Anthropologist Montgomery McFate (2005) provides an example of this when she discusses the assumptions made by some interrogators in the Abu Ghraib prison scandal. She stated a failure to take, “a holistic, total understanding of local culture” and the use of “bad anthropology” along with poor standards of conduct, discipline, and leadership contributed to an outcome that is still alienating the population and affecting coalition operations (2005, 37).

Wadeen (2002) argues against Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations Theory because it assumes deterministic traits and the theory does not account for the historical processes, the power dynamics, influences of other ideas, diverse societal norms, or account for individuals and groups that can shape identity. Instead, Huntington classifies the groups in monolithic blocks rather than looking at the root conditions and factors which make up behavior and event outcomes. In order to get past these conceptualization and analytical issues Wadeen (2002) recommends an approach that provides for descriptive causal and explanatory variables. In addition, she recommends including the effects of structural constraints operating in the person’s or group’s environment. For example, by labeling suicide terrorists as psychologically disturbed and suicide bombings as immoral or illogical, the military limits the ability to understand the various societal, political, and/or economic conditions, circumstances, norms, beliefs, and interests behind the decision to employ suicide bombing as a terror tactic. Once again, this points to the importance of understanding the combination of dynamics and how they impact the current situation on the ground.

The third example is another political science framework that addresses the concept of culture in a more holistic, multi-disciplined, multi-theoretical approach,

known as Social Movement Theory (SMT). SMT uses established comparative political theories in an integrated, multi-dimensional framework which takes into account the fluid and complex dynamics in which key players, groups, or organizations operate. SMT draws upon processes and mechanisms from rational-choice, structural, and cultural comparative political theories that enable a stronger explanatory value of understanding actions and outcomes of groups, organizations, or social movements. SMT focuses on three factors. The first is political opportunity which analyzes the historical and current context a movement finds itself operating within. The second key factor is resource mobilization which looks at the capacity and ability to mobilize given internal and external dynamics. The third key factor is the framing process (how is the message marketed and received) which is used to generate resonance and support for mobilization (Tilly 1978; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Wiktorowicz 2004). SMT treats culture as a cognitive, behavioral, and relational process that impacts the decisions and actions of others as they attempt to organize, garner support, or create opposition.

The last example is a method for capturing the competing theoretical definitions and conceptions by stating common definitional characteristics. The Peace Corps has helped to train thousands in cross-cultural awareness and understanding, and argues that while culture has many definitions, most observers agree on certain characteristics (Peace Corps Handbook 1997). Common definitional characteristics are: 1) culture is collective, shared by a group; 2) culture is learned; 3) it has to do with values, beliefs, assumptions, attitudes, and feelings; 4) it involves customs and traditions; 5) it influences or guides behavior; 6) it is transmitted from generation to generation; 7) it is unconscious or implicit; and 8) it is a response/adaptation to reality. The Handbook (1997) argues when we look at behavior and actions of others, we are actually interpreting what is happening through our own cultural and personal lens. The common definitional characteristics and the interpretive lens argument corresponds to other cross-cultural communications research and to recent initiatives within the DoD to define culture in a more dynamic manner--which will be discussed later in the thesis (Ting-Toomey 1999; Weaver 2000; Weaver 2005)

Empirically, the SMT framework, as well as the research by Johnston, Wedeen, Kohls, Dahl, Klein, and the Peace Corps, provide the military the keys to understanding

culture and its role or influence on individuals, groups, nations, or regions; and in a way that can be utilized operationally by the military. Any definition or conceptualization of culture needs to avoid determinism. This means that culture cannot be expressed as a monolithic or static unit of analysis. Assessment of culture should be conceptualized in degrees or on a continuum, rather than exceptional or rigid “either-or” constructs. It is important to avoid the analytical argument that says everything is culture because it is a circular argument that does not allow for empirical study, an accurate means of conducting influence operations, or identifying strengths and vulnerabilities. Additionally, we need a way to understand causal relationships and that allows for us to understand variation when comparing one entity to another. When studying a society or entity, analytically, culture can be considered an independent, causal, and at times, dependant variable, depending on the unit of analysis. Cultural values, beliefs, norms, attitude, perceptions, and behavior influence other dynamics at the micro-, meso-, and micro-levels (such as identities, communication, institutions, social and relational organization, decisions, etc.). Yet, these very dynamics, as well as national and international dynamics, also influence cultural variables. Therefore, the military’s conceptualization should allow for analysis at various levels, and provide a process for including or excluding variables which would imply taking more of a systems theory approach to culture. (Johnston 1995; Peace Corps Handbook 1997; Geertz 2000; Spencer-Oatey 2000; Wiktorowicz 2001; Wedeen 2002; Dahl 2004; Wiktorowicz 2004; Klein 2004; McFate 2005).

A system is considered a fluid and dynamic complete unit that is made up of interconnected and interdependent parts, all interacting with one another (Gurman and Messer 1995; Corsini and Wedding 2000; Casebeer and Salmoni 2005). Systems theory focuses on the complexity and interdependence of relationships and provides a framework from which to analyze various units within the context of its natural environment (Gurman and Messer 1995; Corsini and Wedding 2000).

This brings us to a proposed DoD conceptualization of culture as a system, and which is based on both social science research and military doctrinal and operational needs. Culture is a fluid and dynamic entity consisting of interrelated and independent parts. It is not inherently static, deterministic, or exceptional. Culture operates at several

levels ranging from cognitive and behavioral dynamics at the micro-, meso-, and macro-level to relational processes at the meso- and macro-levels. Culture includes the more observable outer layers (such as traditions, customs, behavior, structures, outcomes) to the increasingly difficult to grasp cognitive and affective inner layers (such as assumptions, values, feelings, beliefs, narratives, perceptions). Culture manifests itself in systems and institutions as well as behavioral patterns, symbols, and artifacts. Culture serves many functions which allow us as human beings to adapt and survive. Culture acts as an interpretive lens which provides for various levels of identity (at the individual, group, national, regional, and universal levels) which provides meaning and patterns of relating, depending on the context or situation. Culture is shared among, influences, and is shaped by members of a group, community, institution, and the environment. Culture is also transmitted and reinterpreted generationally, based on the context or situation (Johnston 1995; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Peace Corps HB 1997; Ting-Toomey 1999; Hall 1990; Weaver 2000; Geertz 2000; Spencer-Oatey 2000; Wedeen 2002; Wiktorowicz 2004; Lichbach and Zuckerman 2002; Sue and Sue 2003; Klein 2004; Dahl 2004; Casebeer and Salmoni 2005).

For example, the values, beliefs, assumptions, and perceptions of former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein contributed to behavior that helped to create and reinforce a social hierarchy of patronage. At the same time, the rule of law, the repressive nature of the regime, and the changing patterns of a collective society over a thirty-year period, all contributed to the political institutions as they were operating when the U.S. began OIF in 2003. The above also contributed to the perceptions of the Iraqis at the meso- and macro-levels of society. The U.S. attempted to impose its own version of law and order. However, when it initially decided to dismiss the Iraqi Army and bar Ba'ath party members from participating in management and reconstruction, it created an institutional vacuum. This was due to the previous cultural variables and the attempt to restructure society and institutions in a manner not familiar to Iraqis. The U.S. also did not have the security needed to maintain law and order; or the ability to garner local or national legitimacy based on Iraqi values, traditions, beliefs, and perceptions. In addition, the U.S. did not consider the view of the U.S. by Middle East populations, and how that might impact operations when trying to "establish democracy" in Iraq. This short illustration is

very simplistic and while some variables were left out, it does highlight the various cultural units of analysis and how they influenced, and were influenced by, other aspects of the dynamic Iraqi system.

Another example looks at the analytical tools and how they can impact the military. If using a descriptive method to analyze culture, typically social scientists will describe a single entity. We see descriptive studies used a lot in anthropologic ethnographies. The concern with descriptive studies is that narrative is unique to that specific entity. How then do we tie that study into the other empirically-based research in order to analyze the complex dynamics taking place in a foreign country? If using an explanatory method for describing culture, typically social scientists are attempting to compare groups. Many cross-cultural studies attempt to compare and contrast American culture with another. However, if the military member does not have a background in various social science disciplines the danger becomes defining culture and understanding “the other” using static stereotypes and deterministic categories of analysis which result in faulty assessments of the situation. By changing how we conceptualize culture and its integrated interaction within a larger system, and how we teach and learn about it, we move away from the analytical debates and biases that plague the intelligence and academic communities--such as determinism and exceptionalism (Johnston 1995; Lichbach and Zuckerman 2002; Wedeen 2002; Smith 2004).

The military is required to anticipate the actions of decision-makers, adversaries, and other actors, as well as provide course of action recommendations and risk-cost analysis. In order to do this, and because of the reciprocal and interdependent nature of culture with other group, organizational, national, or regional dynamics, the military should also consider the area it operates in as a system (currently known as the “battlespace” and later will be defined as the “operational environment”). This approach also provides the analytical tools to identify and assess the interaction of the fluid entities within a system by discussing the interplay of the current situation, within the context of geographic, social, cultural, political, economic, military, paramilitary, security, and historical dynamics. The previous OIF example also illustrates the importance of understanding the dynamics and relationships of a complex system. A systems approach

will enable analysis of the situational dynamics within the context of the battlespace, given the military mission, objectives, and desired end results.

A systems approach of culture and the battlespace would allow for a common framework of analysis at various levels of study using a multi-theoretical and multi-disciplined methodology. Applying a systems analysis approach to culture and the study of a group, nation, or region allows for descriptive, explanatory, deductive, and patterned analysis and aids a decision-maker with problems of identifying, influencing, or controlling a system or parts of the system, while taking into account multiple objectives, constraints, and resources. A systems approach allows for general awareness of interests, actions, and intended or unintended consequences which arise from the fluid dynamics, complex relationships, and multiple variables (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Wiktorowicz 2004; Casebeer and Salmoni 2005). A systems approach would allow the military to define culture and analyze the battlespace from a perspective that is informed by, and tied to, the social sciences and military doctrine.

A systems approach towards culture and the battlespace, applied to pre-deployment training, and linked with long-term regional educational studies, and language proficiency, will improve the military's ability to operate successfully across the range of military missions. However, before discussing a framework that conceptualizes culture within the dynamic system of the battlespace, and is presented in a concrete way during pre-deployment training, it is important to review what military doctrine has to say about culture and the concept of the battlespace.

III. CULTURE AND MILITARY DOCTRINE

A. WHY CULTURE MATTERS TO THE MILITARY

Are the issues of why culture matters and how to correctly analyze a society a new phenomenon for the military? The short answer is no. There are numerous historical examples where a foreign power, utilizing political and military instruments of power, failed to understand the indigenous cultural dynamics in its attempts to impose its own interests and way of life. Several examples include France in Spain (Smith 2004), the British in India and Iraq (Wolpert 2000; Tripp 2000; Dodge 2003), the French in Algeria (Roberts 2003), as well as U.S. lessons currently being relearned in Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF) (ICG 2004; Putman 2004; Langewiesche 2004; McFate 2005). As McFate (2005) and military members Colonel (Ret) Maxie McFarland (2005) and Major Ron Sargent (2005) correctly argue, culture matters to the military because of issues of ethnocentrism and analytical bias which can affect tactical, operational, and strategic success:

Two issues arise when considering the problem. First, when conventional forces deploy, soldiers or groups of soldiers will innocently or blatantly commit publicized acts of such grievous cultural ignorance as to erode strategic legitimacy and credibility. Second, planning staffs will produce faulty analysis and develop estimates and plans that violate the cultural and societal demands of the environment in which they operate and erode strategic legitimacy and credibility...We simply cannot afford to collaterally alienate the people we are trying to influence, liberate, protect, or aid. In addition, there can be no tolerance for the cultural ignorance of media-amplified “strategic corporals” (junior officers and soldiers at the forward edge of the battle area) whose words and actions can affect strategic outcomes (Sargent 2005, 12).

The following examples point out the importance of understanding culture and how it can impact the military's success. Embedded reporter Ken Dilanian wrote about the experiences of an U.S. Army unit in Iraq,

‘I want some answers,’ SGT 1st Class Aldrich demanded through an interpreter as he shoved the homeowner out his front door. The man’s wife and children watched, sobbing, from a side room. As two soldiers with rifles stood by, Aldrich yelled into the man’s face and whacked the ground with a metal baton the Americans called a ‘haji-be-good stick.’ ‘If I am

out here, and I get shot, I'm shooting every house near me! Because you aren't helping me catch the bad guys, and if you're not helping me, you are the bad guy' (Knight Ridder News Online 2005).

The article goes on to state a common perspective held by the unit is that Iraqis do not understand polite behavior and that only being a "hard-ass" gets results. The unit had arrived in Iraq with almost no training in Arab culture and they only had two interpreters. One such patrol began randomly searching houses on a whim after midnight. The residents turned out to be Christians and when asked why they did it by one of the residents, the soldiers just shrugged and left (Dilanian 2005). Dilanian illustrated another example where a group of soldiers used fists and an electric gun to punish an Iraqi teenager who had flashed his middle finger and as justification the NCO in charge said, "I've got 200,000 Iraqis I've got to control with 18 people, so I've got to command respect" (Knight Ridder News Online 2005). He goes on to note the soldiers called the Iraqi civilians "hajis," which is a stereotyped slang expression that blankets all Iraqis as being part of the insurgency (Dilanian 2005). The examples clearly show a lack of understanding Iraqi societal norms which places importance on protecting family honor. The use of derogatory and monolithic labels highlights the degree of ethnocentrism taking place. The actions of the military members has the potential effect of alienating the family and decreasing the odds of even indirect support for coalition forces, when support of the indigenous population is a crucial requirement in stability operations.

Another example is given by reporter, Mark Mooney, who captured similar feelings of a Marine in Fallujah, "I walk by every day where a friend of mine died. Everybody here is a collaborator with the mujahedeen. They were either living in their homes or next door. Nobody here is innocent" (NY Daily News Online 2005). Ahmed Hashim, a professor of strategic studies at the Navy War College, noted early on there were consistent Iraqi perceptions of overly aggressive and disrespectful American responses to insurgent attacks by searching homes without the presence of the male head of the household and body searches of females by male American soldiers. He also noted that according to several retired Sunni Arab officers, one of the biggest factors promoting the hatred of the U.S. was its cultural ignorance and disdain for the Iraqis (2004).

These examples allude to doctrinal and training issues within the military. They also illustrate the stereotypes and ethnocentrism that can develop when a consistent theoretical framework and sufficient cross-cultural awareness for understanding another culture does not exist (Ting-Toomey 1999; Weaver 2000; Klein 2004; Dahl 2004; Weaver 2005). The next section reviews joint doctrine and discusses its key failures in defining and assessing culture. In addition, it also reviews the framework and methodology used to study the battlespace.

B. JOINT DOCTRINE REVIEW

What is military doctrine and what does it say about culture? The military planning process is a well-oiled, if at times bureaucratic, system that provides for strategic direction; assigns missions, forces, and resources; and details objectives, rules of engagement, and desired end states. Military doctrine is tied into the planning process and it is intended to provide structural guidelines and foundational building blocks for military members and commanders to draw upon in the conduct of military operations. It provides for a common frame of reference and basic employment methods so services can coordinate their actions towards the protection of national interests and achievement of objectives. The intent is not to adhere rigidly to prescribed dogma or ignore the changing dynamics on the ground. Without joint and service doctrine, and associated tactics, techniques, and procedures, the military would be unable to be leveraged as an effective instrument of national policy. It would lack the ability to integrate the numerous players and limited resources required for engagement across the full range of military operations.

Joint doctrine provides for general guidelines and frameworks that apply to all the services, intended to help coordinate activities and procedures across the service divide by providing a common language and set of concepts. Each service also has its own service-specific doctrine that provides additional details and templates for accomplishing mission objectives. The main avenue for military members to orient themselves to a foreign country or operational area (also known as “battlespace”), is to train based on joint doctrine and service-specific tactics, techniques, and procedures; war gaming and

scenario driven exercises; country orientation briefings; unit-generated training or reading programs; as well as a myriad of medical briefs and duty-specific training.

Although at times doctrine seems to parallel the social science debates; in reality, it fails to provide a theoretically sound definition or conceptualization of culture. Some doctrine tries to provide a framework for analyzing another country without a social science foundation. Some doctrine mentions the importance of understanding another society; however, it does not provide the detailed critical analysis of which variables to consider, or how to train or present this information in a relevant context for today's fluid and dynamic operational environment. Lastly, doctrine is geared towards the conduct of a major theater war and therefore uses outdated, Cold War, force-on-force terminology that does not relate to the social sciences or necessarily apply in stability operations (JP 3.07 1995; JP 2-0 2000; JP 3.0 2001; JP 5-00.1 2002; Smith 2004; JP 1-02 2005). Each of these issues creates analytical and operational problems for the military.

For example, the DoD Dictionary defines the word "culture" as an aspect of geography, a "feature of the terrain that has been constructed by man. Included are such items as roads, buildings, and canals; boundary lines; and, in a broad sense, all names and legends on a map" (JP 1-02 2005, 136). Two other military terms applicable to understanding culture and an operational area as a system, "battlespace" and "operational environment," are outdated and misleading. The term "battlespace" is defined as

The environment, factors, and conditions that must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes air, land, sea, space, and the included enemy and friendly forces; facilities; weather; terrain; the electromagnetic spectrum; and the information environment within the operational areas and areas of interest (JP 1-02 2005, 64).

The DoD Dictionary defines "operational environment" as a "composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander. Some examples are as follows....a. permissive environment...b. an uncertain environment...c. hostile environment" (JP 1-02 2005, 386). This really describes the ability to conduct missions within an operational area; not the definition of, or variables operating within, the operational environment.

Joint doctrine is inconsistent in the use of terminology and in its application of analyzing culture or the “battlespace.” Some doctrine lumps culture as a subset of demographics or as part of the nature of society; while other doctrine treats it as its own category or as a subset within the battlespace (JP 3-07 1995; JP 3.0 2001; JP 5-00.1 2002; JP 3-07.1 2004; Smith 2004). For example, some joint doctrine treats culture as nothing more than customs and courtesies; which parallels the social science debate over unit of analysis and one theory that says culture is just group behavioral norms:

Information collection and analysis...will require a depth of expertise in (and a mental and psychological integration with) all aspects of the operational environment’s peoples and their cultures, politics, religion, economics, and related factors; and any variances within affected groups of people. It is only through an understanding of the values by which people define themselves that an intervener can establish for himself a perception of legitimacy (JP 3-07 1995, IV-2).

Yet *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning* (JP 5-00.1 2002) treats culture as “the nature of society” when it states part of SO planning is to assess the nature of the physical environment. JP 5-00.1 (2002) says the physical environment includes factors such as the geography, climate, and access from US and US bases. In addition, the nature of the society should be analyzed. This includes such factors as the population, demographics, history, general culture, economy, politics, infrastructure, military and security forces, potential destabilizing factors, and insurgencies. In addition, JP 5-00.1 (2002) states that planning should consider the nature of external forces, such as other nations, international actors, and transnational forces. Finally, the nature of the crisis needs to be analyzed. This includes identification of critical events, key players, economic problems, natural disasters, government reaction, recent military defeat, religious influences, or ethnic conflict. Once again doctrine is mixing levels of analysis, which might be okay if it actually defined culture; however, it does not and ends up using inconsistent terminology.

Joint doctrine tends to rely on out-dated, Cold War concepts describing large force-on-force tactics. It redefined warfare to allow for a range of military operations; however, the doctrine applies the terms that refer to the Major Theater of War or Major Combat Operations concepts, such as “battlespace” which are not really applicable to stability operations (JP 1-02 2005; JP 3.07 1995; JP 2-01.3 2000; JP 3.0 2001; JP 5-00.1

2002; Smith 2004). For example, key players in stability operations are non-governmental organizations (NGOs). NGOs would be even more hesitant to work with the military if they knew we included them as part of the “battlespace;” which has adversarial connotations. A second example is when describing a pitfall in discovering the adversary’s vulnerabilities, doctrine states that adversaries are usually difficult to identify and attack directly; because the adversary’s vulnerabilities will most likely be “heavily defended” (JP 5-00.1 2002). This implies a heavily defended fortification, which is a dated concept related to the defense of large armies. Another example is doctrine’s tendency to conceptualize “the other” in monolithic blocs such as: “friendly” (e.g. U.S., allies, and non-combatants), “neutral,” and “enemy” instead of recognizing that the SO environment is diverse and complex. Typically, stability operations are complex, dynamic, and involve a fluid continuum of players, roles, and identities, based on the location and interests of the people involved (JP 3.07 1995; JP 2-01.3 2000; JP 3.0 2001; JP 5-00.1 2002; Smith 2004; TCMEF 2005).

A fourth example is the main intelligence framework for assessing the battlespace, *Joint Doctrine 2-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB)* (2000). The JIPB process details the framework used to provide knowledge of the battlespace. This knowledge includes threat assessments considering the terrain, weather, infrastructure, cultural characteristics, medical conditions, population, and leadership. The JIPB doctrine says there are significant characteristics of the battlespace which will influence friendly and adversary operations such as geography, weather, infrastructure, local economic and health conditions, and demographic factors. It includes political, religious, and ethnic factors within the category of demographics. The JIPB doctrine (2000) also recommends analysis of the effectiveness of the host nation government, military forces, and law enforcement agencies. The problem is the JIPB doctrine (2000) does not define what “cultural characteristics” are, and it gives no further details (see Appendix A for the four-step JIPB process).

The JIPB document (2000) states its primary purpose is to guide preparatory intelligence analysis for major combat, force-on-force operations. It is not until the last chapter of the JIPB doctrine where it discusses JIPB support in SO environments. The

doctrine explains the primary difference between JIPB for conventional war and stability operations is just one of focus, a higher level of detail, and a stronger emphasis on demographic analysis (JP 2-01.3 2000). This is not very helpful for understanding what dynamics are at play and what should be analyzed for missions outside of major combat operations.

The last example of joint doctrinal inconsistency and lack of theoretical definitions and conceptualizations is the Joint Doctrine for Foreign Internal Defense (FID) (JP 3.07.1 2004). It states knowledge of the operational area is required to maximize the effectiveness of military operations and that it is difficult to interact with the host nation if we do not have an understanding of the background of the nation, the culture, and the customs. The doctrine goes on to say it is important to have language training and to understand the importance of the image the military projects to the host nation population. The FID doctrine (2004) even provides a detailed template of the intelligence information required to support the various types of FID missions. It includes culture as one of the factors to consider when analyzing the operational area, in which data is collected in several categories: political, military, economic, religious, social, endemic diseases and health status of the population, geographic, psychological, cultural, friendly forces, threat forces, and nonbelligerent third party forces. However, as with the rest of the joint doctrine, it does not fully explain what is meant by culture and treats it as an aspect of population analysis (JP 3.07.1 2004).

Overall, joint doctrine is equating culture as either behavioral norms, individual or group level cognitive processes, or labels culture as “psychology” without the rest of the theoretical underpinning (such as definition, unit of analysis, variables, generalizations made, and culture’s impact). Joint doctrine lacks consistency in the analytical framework and methodologies used to study the battlespace. In terms of training, doctrine fails to recognize the “strategic sergeant” environment and the junior enlisted interacting with an indigenous population. For example, doctrine stresses the importance of professional military education, but only for officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). It also recognizes the importance of training for individuals, units, and staffs but says due to insufficient time to train, just by having military leaders who have a solid understanding of SO can help the rest of the force adapt. There is an underlying Cold War assumption

that does not take into account the information operations reality of today's military missions. This style of training will not work in the "strategic sergeant" environment and runs counter to social science research in cross-cultural communication (JP 3.07 1995; Ting-Toomey 1999; Weaver 2000; JP 2-01.3 2000; JP 3.0 2001; JP 5-00.1 2002; Weaver 2005). Does service doctrine fair any better in its attempts to define and conceptualize culture or analyze the battlespace?

C. SERVICE DOCTRINE REVIEW

Service doctrine states the importance of understanding culture; however, service doctrine suffers from the same issues as joint doctrine (in terms of terminology, inconsistency, and a lack of an empirically based methodology for studying culture). It fairs a little better in terms of providing a framework and methodology for analyzing the battlespace; however, it lacks consistency in the units of analysis and variables used. For example, the *Interim Army Field Manual on Counterinsurgency*, FM 3-07.22, recognizes that culture matters and treats it as a behavioral norm. However the manual fails to provide any definitions of culture or tie it into the social science research or even joint doctrine:

Understanding the local society and gaining its support is critical to success. For U.S. forces to operate effectively among a local population and gain and maintain their support, it is important to develop a thorough understanding of the society and its culture, including its history, tribal/family/social structure, values, religions, customs, and needs... Understanding and working within the social fabric of a local area is initially the most influential factor in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. Unfortunately, this is often the factor most neglected by U.S. forces (as cited in McFate 2005, 37).

A fairly well organized template for the analysis of an operational area is Appendix G of FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Area Study and Assessment Format* (2000). As with other joint and service doctrine, Appendix G of FM 41-10 (2000) fails to ever define culture, or tie it to the social science research. It breaks down an assessment of an area by the following categories: General, Legal, Public Administration, Public Health, Public Safety, Economic Development, Civilian Supply, Property Control, Food and

Agriculture, Public Communications, Public Transportation, Public Works and Utilities, Cultural Relations, Civil Information, Dislocated Civilians, Emergency Services, and Environmental Management.

The manual describes “culture” as a sub-category of “Culture and Social Structure,” which falls into the “People” category under the main header, “General.” In terms of the manual’s concept of culture, it gets a little confusing because the manual considers culture to be the history, government and geography as they affect the cultural makeup; heroes and leaders of groups; ethnic groups; minority groups; moral codes; attitudes towards age, sex, race; influence on personality development; privacy; nature of peoples perceptions; clothing, fatalism or self-determination; and economic values (FM 41-10 2000). The manual considers behavioral norms to be a sub-category of “Social Structure” (FM 41-10 2000). At the same time the manual has another category titled, “Cultural Relations” which deals solely with religion.

Appendix G of FM 3-06.11, *An Infantryman’s Guide to Urban Combat* (2002) discusses intelligence support requirements for urban operations. On one hand, the manual does not define culture; on the other hand, the manual treats culture as a group or societal behavioral norm. It says it is important to understand the various and divergent cultural norms; religious beliefs; aspects of the local governance (to include economic and socio-geographic issues); as well as ethnic, racial, tribal, or terrorist/criminal aspects and interests of the local population. At the same time, the field manual provides some basic checklist questions covering urban data, population data, and includes aspects of culture within its “Social Structure” checklist. The “Social Structure” checklists asks basic questions about the religion, national origins, tribal/clan structures, terrorist or gang or organized crime data, economic classes, political and government structures, social action taboos, languages, social splits, issues motivating political behavior or groups, history of conflicts, population loyalty, and lastly, media influences.

FMI 2-91.4 (2005) provides the Army’s tactical intelligence guidance and checklists for operating in an urban environment. FMI 2-91.4 (2005) provides a little more detail on the types of information required to understand a country’s culture than FM 3-06.11 (2002) does. Once again, without defining it, this manual treats culture as a

behavioral norm. It correctly acknowledges that to operate effectively in an urban population and to maintain their goodwill, it is important to develop, “a thorough understanding of the society and its culture, to include values, needs, history, religion, customs, and social structure” (1-20). This manual begins to discuss cross-cultural communications issues, such as noting the concerns of mirror-imaging, and argues, “If U.S. intelligence professionals assess an incidence using our own societal norms and values as a reference, it is highly likely that the significance of the event will be misinterpreted” (1-21).

The updated, draft-version of the USMC Small Wars Manual (SWM) (2005) recognizes that culture affects warfare and having a detailed understanding of local culture is important to mission success. It begins to treat culture as a behavioral norm and briefly touches on cross-cultural communication issues when it acknowledges the culture shock Marines may encounter when they are, “thrust into a foreign context unprepared for the complexities of interacting with a society who’s norms and practices are bewildering at best and seemingly irrational from a Western perspective” (SWM 2005, 18). It also recognizes the importance of reducing mirror imaging or cognitive dissonance when it states,

This requires an ability to assess foreign cultures and to suspend our own cultural lens that acts as a prism and orients what we perceive and how we react to events. Looking at events and circumstances from the perspective of the opponent or the local population is a difficult but crucial aspect of Small Wars due to the intense and intimate contact between Marine forces and the host nation’s populace and civil administration. (SWM 2005, 19)

The SWM (2005), for the first time, actually attempts to define culture in a way that is consistent with some of the theoretical social science definitions. It takes a broader definition of culture when it says culture is a combination of national history, myth, geography, beliefs, ethnic backgrounds and religion and is,

The totality of socially transmitted behavior patterns, arts, beliefs, institutions, and thought characteristic of a community or population. Culture is a complex aggregate of learned habits and attitudes acquired by a member of society. It works at many levels, sometimes overtly, but most powerfully as a deeply embedded set of values or beliefs in the subconscious of the individual. (SWM 2005, 25)

It even attempts to provide a methodology for analyzing culture. The SWM (2005) states an examination of the culture has to include analysis of the strategic environment and according to its structural components (SWM 2005). It says this is done by examining aspects of culture such as a society's science, language, history, art, myth, and religion; followed by an analysis of other "macro-contextual issues" which it lists as the political, geographic, and economic elements of a society or country.

The manual attempts to provide a more detailed understanding of how to go about learning a culture by defining what it calls "degrees of cultural knowledge." Cultural knowledge contains three aspects: cultural understanding, cultural factors, and cultural intelligence. Cultural understanding includes basic cultural awareness, which would include a framework for how to study culture, as well as training for a particular cultural environment that includes customs as well as the why of certain values and thoughts. Cultural factors are described as aspects of a foreign society, "to include religion, language, history, heroes, attitudes, customs and rituals, mores, values, practices, biases, perceptions, and assumptions. This will include all elements that effect how a person or a people think and what drives them to action. These factors make up the cultural aspects of the battlefield" (SWM 2005, 26). Cultural intelligence is defined as the incorporation of cultural factors into analysis to support the commander's decision making (SWM 2005). Unfortunately, the degrees of cultural knowledge are rather confusing and tend to overlap. Cultural factors are an aspect of the JIPB process and therefore an aspect of cultural intelligence. Cultural understanding, when you read further, includes the main categories of cultural factors as the way to study a culture; however, it does not give any further information on what the actual training would consist of.

Overall, joint and service doctrine mentions the importance of understanding culture and to be wary of mirror imaging. While joint and service doctrine treat culture as a behavioral norm; neither provides sufficient or consistent detail on how to define, conceptualize, or analyze a foreign culture. Some of the doctrine is geared towards the conduct of major combat operations and therefore uses Cold War, force-on-force terminology. Joint doctrine, even while trying to address stability operations suffers from basic analytical flaws and is not tied to an empirical framework, based on social science research (JP 3-07 1995; JP 2-01.3 2000; JP 3.0 2001; JP 5-00.1 2002; JP 3.0 2004; JP 3-

07.1 2004). In addition, both joint and service doctrine are inconsistent in their analytical framework when assessing the dynamics at play within the battlespace. Joint doctrine does not provide guidance on what empirical resources should be relied on besides higher headquarters products. It does not provide guidance on what social science theories were drawn upon in the analysis of higher headquarter products or information. It does not require a resource listing or a statement of the analytical methodology used in the higher headquarters or intelligence products. It also does not provide recommendations on tools or assessments to help minimize analytical bias.

The failure to consistently and empirically define and conceptualize culture is one reason why current training programs are so diverse and lack critical peer assessments or reviews. The same can also be said for the failure to consistently and empirically define and conceptualize the battlespace as a system. If the military members receiving the training are not versed in the literature and research, or vice versa, if the academic instructors are not versed in military doctrine or employment, how can they be sure they are training and teaching to the level required for the military in today's fluid and dynamic operational environment? What changes could be made to doctrine which would enable ties to social science and include a systems approach that meets the military's needs? Before answering this question, it would help to review and discuss recent initiatives taking place within the DoD community.

D. OTHER ATTEMPTS TO DEFINE AND CONCEPTUALIZE CULTURE

Recently, the National Security Strategy, the National Military Strategy, the Joint Operations Concepts, the Functional Concepts for Battlespace Awareness, as well as joint and service doctrine, and military-related articles reference or allude to the need for regional knowledge and expertise (JP 3-07 1995; JP 2-01.3 2000; JP 3.0 2001; JP 5-00.1 2002; JP 3-07.1 2004; Salmoni 2004; McFate 2005; McFarland 2005; Sargent 2005; Scales 2005; USMC SWM 2005; Rader, Mitchell, and Dolan 2005). They mention the importance of achieving dominance which would require an understanding of the physical, cultural, social, political, and economic factors within an operational environment. As Rader, Mitchell, and Dolan (2005) sum up, "Shaping ambiguous situations and achieving decision superiority and battlespace awareness in a multilateral

environment mandate that the Joint Force possess foreign language and regional expertise capabilities” (11). The DoD’s new Defense Language Transformation Roadmap and the new Air Force International Affairs Program are long-term educational and manpower-related proposals for how to create better foreign area specialists, regional area specialists, and linguists. These directives, initiatives, and reports are an excellent beginning to the military’s conceptualization of how to improve linguistic and regional expertise. Yet these directives and initiatives are long-term in focus and do not address how to empirically define and conceptualize culture. They also are not looking at how to improve pre-deployment training to reflect the military’s desire to improve “cultural awareness” in the short-term.

There have also been some excellent discussions, articles, and other initiatives within the DoD arguing why culture matters. For example, the Office of Naval Research (ONR) and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) sponsored a conference on the importance of understanding foreign culture and the goal was to initiate dialogue between various military and civilian institutions. Other initiatives that stress the importance of culture and ways to incorporate it into the intelligence or educational process include seminar presentations by Lt Col William Wunderle, working groups sponsored by Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (HQ USMC) and its associated intelligence organization (MCIA), as well as Lt Col George Smith’s essay (Connable 2004; Wunderle 2004; Smith 2004).

A recent initiative by the DoD will require officer language training and intends to tie it to general officer promotion. Additionally, the DoD is requesting more military political affairs and regional specialists; and they are attempting to restructure the services’ foreign area officer requirements (Chief of Staff 2005; Scutro 2005). Other military articles argue more junior officers should be taught critical thinking and analytical skills or request the DoD increase the number of social science subject matter experts (Carafano 2005; Vane and Fagundes 2005; Scales 2005; Sargent 2005; McFate 2005). In addition to these discussions and initiatives, there are good intelligence products on various countries that have tried to tap into other social science research (MCIA 2004).

There have also been some valiant in-house attempts at cultural training guides (Connable 2004; TRADOC 2005; CALL 2005; USA ITP 2005). However, many tend to be too basic or even ethnocentric when read alone, taken out of context, or used without the proper level of cultural awareness training (Ting-Toomey 1999). For example, in an effort to capture the Iraqi mindset in eight pages and contrast it with those of U.S. Marines, comments about the Iraqis include

Unless you catch on we'll take what we can get. If you're too stupid to figure out what we're doing, it's your fault, not ours...There is no real shame in corruption; after all, we're looking out for our families as expected...We do not respect law the way you do because for us law comes from the end of a gun...We are stuck in a rut, and we need someone who has the capacity to see a better future to guide us onto the right path (Connable 2004, 7-8).

These statements actually do more harm than intended when the audience has not been exposed to cross-cultural differences or their own biases. It tends to reinforce the very stereotypes trying to be dispelled or explained (Ting-Toomey 1999; Dahl 2004; Weaver 2000).

Another service example is the Army's Training and Doctrine Command, which attempted to distill the essence of "Arab Cultural Awareness" down to 51 Factsheets (TRADOC 2005). While it tries to set straight some myths--such as "The Arab world is backwards and uncivilized"--it makes its own ethnocentric mistake when it describes the Arab worldview as based on six concepts, two being "wish versus reality" and "paranoia" (TRADOC 2005, 14).

There have been three recent initiatives to define culture. One is McFarland's (2005) article in which he discusses the importance of culture and how it relates to needed changes in the military's educational system. He defines culture as the "Origins, values, roles, and material items associated with a particular group of people. Such definitions refer to evaluative standards, such as norms or values, and cognitive standards, such as rules or models defining what entities and actors exist in a system and how they operate and interrelate" (McFarland 2005, 62-63). This definition corresponds to several social science theoretical definitions because it takes a structural cognitive and

behavioral approach. However, it also includes material items. The question for the military becomes, is this the best definition to meet the operational needs of the military?

Another recent definition of culture is given by the HQ USMC and the American, Britain, Canada, Australia Cultural Awareness (ABC) Project Team as they attempted to fill the gap in joint doctrine. Notice their definition of culture is using a tactically ground-centric term:

Cultural Terrain. Culture is simply another element of terrain. Cultural terrain parallels geographic terrain for military consideration as both influence decisions. Cultural terrain presents battlespace obstacles and opportunities.

Cultural Factors. Cultural Factors are dynamic aspects of society that have the capacity to affect military operations. They include religion, ethnicity, language, customs, values, practices, perceptions and assumptions, and driving causes like economy and security. All these factors affect the thinking and motivation of the individual or group and make up the cultural terrain of the battlespace. Not all factors are applicable to all operations, and additional factors may be considered as necessary.

Cultural Awareness (CA). CA is the knowledge of Cultural Factors and an understanding of their impact on the planning and conduct of military operations (ABC TTP 2005, 2).

One concern with the ABCA and HQ USMC proposed definition of culture is that it is ground-centric in its terminology and implies culture is only a feature of the terrain or a geographic construct.

The ABCA and HQ USMC have also begun to provide more detailed analytical questions, relating to cultural factors, which should be asked when looking at the battlespace. In an attempt to provide a more multi-theoretical scope, McFate (2004) recommends cultural factors should also include myths, narratives, and social structures. In addition, analysts from MCIA and HQ USMC recommend viewing the battlespace in terms of a continuum of interests rather than the monolithic, cold-war, enemy, friend, or neutral labels (TCMEF 2005).

The third current working definition of culture is found in The US Army JFK Special Warfare Center's Political Military Analysis Handbook (2004). The handbook is

an excellent resource which provides an analytical framework for looking at the “cultural factors” used by the USMC and ABCA. The handbook uses a different unit of analysis and equates culture as one of the sixteen political-military factors that can influence military operations, rather than equate culture as the entire battlespace. It defines culture as

Learned and shared attitudes, values, and ways of behaving in a society. Culture includes customs, folkways, manners, mannerisms, etiquette, behaviors, body language, gestures, celebrations, milestones, dress, outlooks, perceptions, and thought patterns. It is embodied in history, art, myths, legends and heroes. It addresses appropriate responses to situations. It determines the circumstances and quality of apology, retribution, reward, punishment, equity, commiseration, disdain, shame, guilt, congratulations and pride. It selects and applies social sanction and reward. It expresses itself in superstitions, outlooks, perspectives, conventional knowledge and points of view. It encompasses the sense of time, individuality, possessions, sharing, self-worth and group-worth. It establishes the social hierarchy, defining roles by sex, age, position, religion, wealth, family and profession. In essence, culture defines what is and is not okay, accepted, and normal (JFK SWC HB 2004, 13-1).

The document goes on to describe characteristics, social structure, philosophic outlook, psychological orientation, thought patters, basic values, perceptions, and interactions of culture using cross-cultural communication research (Weaver 2000). It also describes cultural aspects on a continuum, rather than deterministic, linear, “either-or” analysis (JFK SWC HB 2004).

In the ABCA’s initiative to detail the cultural factors, and the Special Warfare Center’s definition of culture, we see the very debates that have been going on in the social sciences. In attempting to define culture, these initiatives are asking: is culture a cognitive and/or behavioral construct? Is culture just behavioral norms or should culture be conceptualized as more inclusive? Should material constructs and institutions be included in a conceptualization of culture? Once again, the answer for the military when analyzing a region or country is to define and conceptualize culture as an interdependent factor within a dynamic social system. The next section recommends how doctrine should be updated in order to reflect a systems approach that is tied to the social science research, and at the same time meets the military’s diverse missions and operational needs.

E. DOCTRINE RECOMMENDATIONS

As mentioned in the last chapter and throughout this chapter, there are two issues to understanding the battlespace. The first is how to conceptualize culture. The second is how to analyze culture while also understanding the other dynamics that are operating within a system. Given the gaps and inconsistencies, should we throw out doctrine? No, of course not, doctrine serves a crucial role for the military. Joint and service doctrine just needs to be updated and tied to the empirical research so we can once again have a structural framework from which to guide, educate, and train.

The foregoing analysis provides a good argument for why the current DoD definitions for “operational environment” and “battlespace” should be changed. The term “battlespace” reflects the major combat operations environment, not the entire range of military operations, or the range of interests by actors and various organizations, depending on the mission. Instead of levels of permissiveness, the definition for the “operational environment” should combine the meanings of “battlespace” and “operational area” found in JP 1-02 (2005) with the HQ USMC/ABCA’s (2005) concept of “cultural factors.” The revised term “operational environment” would be defined as, *the dynamic aspects of a region, country, group, or situation which can impact military operations. The fluid dynamics of history, society, culture, politics, economics, the military/paramilitary/security forces, and current events must be understood to successfully leverage military power and protect the force in order to complete the mission. The scope of the operational environment depends on the mission and the geographical area in which military operations are conducted.*

A precedent has been set for use of the term “operational environment” in the FID doctrine (2004) which describes the JIPB process as beginning with a broad “operational area evaluation.” In order to provide consistency, it is also recommended that JIPB should be changed to Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE). The use of the term operational environment would enable a conceptualization of a system with interdependent parts, operating at with various levels, depending on the scope of the mission.

When it comes to conceptualizing culture, there are some good beginnings by various organizations; however, they disagree as to the level of analysis and assumptions being made. When analyzing a region or country, they do not agree if culture should be considered the entire battlespace, or just be a separate sub-factor or variable within the battlespace. As mentioned in the last chapter, each social science theory has some explanatory power; however, for the military each theory also has conceptual, empirical, and theoretical limits (Lichbach and Zuckerman 2002; Wedeen 2002). A cultural systems approach recognizes there are multiple levels to understanding a society or situation; as well as multiple variables interacting within the system. A systems approach considers different levels of analysis separately; the individual, group, national, and regional levels, and breaks each one into cognitive and behavioral elements and processes. The systems approach, furthermore, understands these levels and processes are inherently intertwined, sharing a reciprocal relationship. Depending on the current situation and the interplay of the geographic environment, and social, cultural, political, economic, military, and historical dynamics, people will have multiple identities that influence their behavior. By analyzing the cultural factors and conditions of the operational environment, and how they impact the dynamic system of the operational environment, we are given a richer understanding than mono-theoretical methodologies in social science, or the force-on-force methodologies in current joint doctrine.

The challenge for the military, when preparing to deploy and operate in an unfamiliar operational environment, is how to incorporate a conceptualization of culture and the operational environment as a system into current doctrine; tactics, techniques, and procedure; and training. The solution is for the military to analyze the operational environment using a JIPOE framework. The JIPOE framework considers the dynamic factors and conditions of eight key areas and includes cultural awareness training. Seven key areas are geography, society, politics, economics, military/paramilitary/security, history, and the current situation based on the military's mission and objectives. Culture is conceptualized analytically by generating cultural awareness (i.e. the appropriate knowledge, skills, and attitudes) through cross-cultural communications training. Cross-cultural communication provides for awareness of our own biases, knowledge of

similarities and differences, culture shock and ethnocentric expectation management tools, language training, and customs and courtesies (Ting-Toomey 1999; Weaver 2000; Klein 2004).

Analysis of the operational environment and culture using the JIPOE template allows us to adapt, acculturate, establish relationships, and influence in order to meet mission requirements. It prepares military members to operate at a higher level of operational effectiveness, which SO and the “strategic sergeant” informational environment require. The next section reviews the current training programs, and discusses an empirically-based JIPOE pre-deployment framework and template.

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IV. AN EMPIRICALLY-BASED PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING PROGRAM FRAMEWORK

A. REVIEW OF CURRENT PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING PROGRAMS

Reviews of OIF interviews, lessons learned, and after action reports note the importance of understanding the norms, interests, and behaviors of many groups and the challenge this presents when operating in an unfamiliar and uncertain operational environment, especially if personnel are not “culturally aware and competent” (ONR 2004; Glenn 2005; TCMEF 2004; McFarland 2005). This challenge gets more complex when trying to meet short-term versus long-term education and training needs with the high operational tempo, diverse missions, and security realities of stability operations. Many pre-deployment programs have been established, or proposed, in an attempt to meet the existing needs of the military during OEF and OIF, and UN/NATO missions. This section reviews many of the current training programs. Overall, the majority of the pre-deployment training programs provide orientation-level familiarization. However, as a whole, the services lack a consistent, accurate, flexible yet standardized, and empirically-based JIPOE framework with the cross-cultural communication piece tied in.

Programs and documents reviewed for this thesis include: the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Political Military Analysis Handbook (2004); the *Marine Corps Intelligence Activity’s Arab and Islamic Culture* DVD (2004) and *Cultural Intelligence for Military Operations: Iraq Cultural Intelligence Study* (2004); the Naval Postgraduate School/Center for Civil Military Relation’s Leader Development and Education for Sustained Peace Program (LDSEP) (2004); the Naval Postgraduate School/Center for Contemporary Conflict’s Regional Security Education Program (RSEP) (2005); the Naval Postgraduate School/USMC Training and Education Command’s Tactical Culture for Marine Expeditionary Forces (TCMEF) Pre-Deployment Training Support Program (2005); Joint Special Operations University Middle East Orientation Course (JSOU MEOC) (2005); Joint Special Operations University Cross-Cultural Communications Course (JSOU CCC)(2005); Center for Army Lessons Learned Iraqi Training Program (USA ITP) (2004); ABCA’s Draft Culture Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (2005); University of Military Intelligence Iraq

Cultural Awareness and Training (2005); and David Rababy's proposed Cultural Awareness and Intelligence: Middle East Culture Training Module (2005). There are two other programs that have not been reviewed as of yet: Advanced Strategic Initiatives, Inc.'s Cultural Awareness Training (2005), and the Cultural Lens Model training used in 2002 at the Stabilization Force (SFOR) Headquarters in Bosnia (Klein 2004).

Depending on what program a person or unit attended, and who was teaching, they would receive substantially different information. Some programs are specifically designed at the familiarization or orientation level; yet are being utilized by units as pre-deployment programs. There are programs that rely on various social science and regional experts (political scientists, anthropologists, linguists, conflict resolution experts, DoS and DoD analysts, and even journalists) which is an excellent beginning. However, some programs have tasked professors, who only have a cursory knowledge of the history and events in a country, to give country-specific political analysis and future scenario assessments. The programs provide different views on what "culture" is. Feedback from some personnel state they associate what they have learned about "culture" as nothing more than either customs and courtesies or a simplistic understanding of "identity" without the larger cross-cultural communications context and why it should matter to them (Connable 2004; TCMEF 2004).

Several programs/initiatives rely on minimal social science research, while others suffer from limited critical review due to "ownership" rights, making the data presented potentially biased or out of date. For example, in one case a contractor is selling a decent basic orientation training program that included some out-dated fieldwork; however, the entire program had not been critically evaluated by military analysts and academic peers before being marketed and used by one service. This orientation program breaks up levels of training based on rank, and its learning strategy for commanders is to just provide more in-depth reading. Two programs attempted to provide news updates after the training program was completed; however, they were not consistent in their attempts to make it relevant to the military. They would consolidate news blurbs but there was no analysis of why that news was significant or would impact a unit's mission. Some of the pre-deployment training programs have not been tied to educational levels of learning or to military doctrine, and do not include cross-cultural communication training. Without

addressing these areas, what is taught is potentially subjective, disorganized, and irrelevant for the military audience. Other programs are little more than personal experiences wrapped up and billeted as cultural awareness training without the empirical foundation to support it. Given the limitations facing the current training programs, what are the key issues to be aware of as a new pre-deployment training program is designed?

B. KEY CONSIDERATIONS FOR AN EMPIRICALLY-BASED TRAINING PROGRAM

There are seven key considerations to keep in mind when building an empirically-based pre-deployment training framework and template. This section introduces the seven key considerations and the next section will provide more specifics when the actual framework is discussed. First, when designing and presenting a pre-deployment training program, it is important set realistic expectations. In the time allotted for a pre-deployment training program, there is no way to learn about the operational environment to the same degree that someone is exposed to either through a postgraduate degree, experientially over time by living in a country, or through the knowledge and confidence that comes from language proficiency. However, just as there are effective brief methods of counseling (depending on the individual, the presenting issues, and goals) there are also ways to distill critical aspects of the operational environment and present it at various levels to a deploying unit (Gladding and Newsome 2004; Klein 2004). In addition, there are learning strategies that can be used to generate cross-cultural awareness so military members are more cognizant of their actions. The appropriate cross-cultural communications training can help to reduce incidents culture shock, stereotypes, and ethnocentrism; all of which impact mission success (AFM 36-2234 1993; Ting-Toomey 1999; Weaver 2000; Clark 2000; Sue and Sue 2003; Klein 2004).

The second key consideration is to identify the mission of those units, the geographical scope of their operational environment, and if possible, the commander's intent. The third key consideration is to know what interaction or impact a unit will have in the day-to-day mission operations or interaction with the local population. Knowledge of the mission, area of responsibility, commander's intent, indigenous interaction, and mission impact allow a commander or training section to determine the depth and breadth

of cross-cultural communication training and the JIPOE template they want taught (either at the basic, intermediate, or advanced level). For example, someone supporting influence operations, a commander and their staff, or an officer/enlisted member conducting patrols and interacting with the local population would require an intermediate or advanced level of preparation. On the other hand, rear area support personnel may only require an orientation or basic level of training. Understanding the mission, such as the Marine's Stability and Support Operations or the beginning phases of OIF, will entail a different focus for the training modules. Additionally, a unit deploying to only one section of the country most likely will want to focus part of the training on region specifics in order to make it mission relevant (for example, in 2004, a Marine MEF deployed to Al-Anbar whereas an Army infantry division deployed to the Kurdish region in Northern Iraq).

The fourth key consideration is presenting an analysis of the operational environment based on military doctrine and needs. The use of the proposed JIPOE framework and template provides a standard guideline that is based on empirical research and doctrine, detailed enough for SO, and tied to the military's concepts and learning strategies. It will also enable presenters to incorporate up-to-date military relevant information, concepts, illustrations, stories, and examples based on on-going operations, lessons learned, and feedback from returning units. For example, in 2004, a portion of the Marine's pre-deployment training utilized recommendations from personnel currently deployed in the region as well as mission-relevant open source information. Some of the data also included shifts in the make-up of the insurgency, increases in organized criminal activity, and current events. The focus was to highlight how these issues would impact the military's mission. It also enabled the deploying personnel to realize they would be more engaged in reconstruction and civil affairs activities than they were originally expecting to be (TCMEF 2004).

The fifth key consideration is to incorporate cross-cultural communication (CCC) training. Research shows that the degree of hostility, stereotypes, and ethnocentrism are directly linked to the knowledge, awareness, confidence, and competence levels a person has when they experience people and behaviors that are different from their own (Ting-Toomey 1999; Weaver 2000; Klein 2004; Weaver 2005). There are stages a person encounters as they are exposed to an unknown operational environment. In one of the

stages, known as the hostility stage, a person usually reacts by flight, fight, or commitment (Ting-Toomey 1999). In the flight state, a person usually withdraws and avoids interaction with their environment. An example of this would be discussions with Army personnel on a 1997 deployment to Vicenza, Italy. Several personnel recounted how they did not like to venture off post because the Italians were too different, they were not interested in learning the language, and they said they would only eat at the on-post facilities for their entire assignment. In the fight state, people tend to act with more moderate to severe ethnocentrism and/or hostility. An example of this is when some returning Marines labeled all Iraqis as lazy and dishonest, or admitted to not wanting to follow Iraqi negotiation customs and would rather “just get down to business” (USA ITP 2004; TCMEF 2005). In contrast, in the commitment state and other stages, people feel prepared to engage locally in their environment. This is evidenced in interviews with several returning senior officers. They detailed how they felt prepared and comfortable interacting with Iraqis and in following Iraqi local customs, when the mission allowed (TCMEF 2005).

The sixth key consideration is to tie the training program to the appropriate educational level of learning (refer to the next section for additional details). The right level of learning is important because SO requires high-order levels of cognitive, affective, and psycho-motor learning; especially when the military is interacting with the indigenous population for extended periods of time (AFM 36-2234 1993; McFate 2005; McFarland 2005). The higher the level of learning, the more intense the training and the more time that is required to effectively integrate the required knowledge, skills, and attitudes (AFM 36-2234 1993; Clark 2000; AFM 36-2236 2003; JP 3.07.1 2004; Draft JP 3.0 2004; Kearsley 2005). The seventh key consideration is to ensure a multi-pronged approach, relying on a variety of learning strategies and media. This consideration caters to different individual methods of learning rather than the presenters’ preferences and away from strictly lectures or briefings, known in the military as “death by PowerPoint.” Given the challenge facing military members in the SO environment, it is crucial to tie higher levels of learning with the appropriate dynamics affecting the conditions of the operational environment (utilizing CCC training and the JIPOE template), and in a multi-

media format that can be tailored to the audience. This is another reason why orientation briefs and lectures, the format followed by most current deployment training programs, are not enough.

These seven key considerations, depending on the mission and the audience, suggest the military has to be willing to accommodate longer pre-deployment training timelines than the current one to five-day mass-briefings allow (Clark 2000; AFM 36-2236 2003). The material should also be taught and evaluated by qualified academic and military professionals to ensure what is being taught is consistent, accurate, up-to-date, and tailored to the military individuals and units receiving the training. Equipped with an empirically-based conceptualization of culture as a system, that is also tied to a doctrinally-based definition of the operational environment, along with the key considerations, the next two sections address educational levels of learning and learning strategies and why they are important for any training program.

C. EDUCATIONAL LEVELS OF LEARNING

What are educational levels of learning and why are they important? Levels of learning are still one of the most widely used constructs found in educational learning theory (see Appendix B). They were originally developed by Benjamin Bloom and an educational committee in 1956 (AFM 36-2234 1993; Cook 2000; AFM 36-2236 2003). Bloom and the committee, as well as other researchers who added to their original work, developed a cognitive and behavioral taxonomy for how individuals learn (AFM 36-2236 2003). The taxonomy has three domains (cognitive, affective, and psychomotor) which can be viewed as categories that describe the goals of a learner-centered training process (AFM 36-2234 1993; Cook 2000; AFM 36-2236 2003). The cognitive domain involves knowledge and the development of intellectual skills. The affective domain depicts how we deal with things emotionally (such as feelings, values, appreciation, enthusiasm, motivation, and attitudes). Lastly, the psychomotor domain describes physical movement, coordination, and use of specific motor-skills (AFM 36-2234 1993; Cook 2000; AFM 36-2236 2003).

The levels of knowledge, skills, and attitudes in the taxonomy are based on the learning theory presumption that the “human mind requires that data have meaning. It rejects nonsense and works actively to find or create meaning for the perceptions it takes from the environment, using the contexts of stored meanings that individuals build up during their lifetime” (AFH 36-2235v10 2002, 158). Theories of adult learning, which include experiential and social learning, are important for the military because of the extensive interpersonal interaction involved in many duties and missions (whether it be intra-service, multi-service, multi-national, or working with an indigenous population). Therefore, the military uses this combined-theoretical instructional approach for teaching adults as part of its curriculum planning process, known as Instructional Systems Development (ISD) (AFM 36-2234 1993; AFM 36-2236 2003). When it comes to the cognitive domain, there are six increasingly-complex levels: knowledge, comprehension, application, analysis, synthesis, and evaluation. Typically at the knowledge-level the desired outcome is the recall of specific information. At the comprehension-level, the outcome is to give meaning to what was learned, establish relationships, and/or extrapolate beyond basic recall or recognition. At application-level and above, students are required to put previously learned concepts and principles into use in progressively complex situations (AFM 36-2234 1993; Cook 2000; AFM 36-2236 2003).

Establishing educational levels of learning for pre-deployment training based on the mission and audience is key. If military members are expected to problem-solve, troubleshoot, as well as be flexible and responsive to the fluid dynamics on the ground--which is frequently the case in a SO environment--then it equates to higher levels of learning. In order to train at the higher levels of learning, individuals have to first pass through the lower levels. If they do not, military members will experience difficulty applying information or skills in new situations (AFM 36-2236 2003). For example, the initial trend analysis of over seventy surveys and interviews of returning Marines and soldiers suggest a direct correlation between the depth and breadth of training they received (to include cross-cultural communications knowledge, skills, and attitudes) and their ability to interact successfully with the Iraqi population (TCMEF 2004). Typically, the lower military ranks received less in-depth country orientation training and received limited to no CCC training.

Research and the analysis of the interviews and surveys suggest that if military members are not able to become aware and assess their own biases and ethnocentric assumptions, they will fail to attain the proper cognitive and affective levels of learning. This will potentially result in repeated stereotyping, aggressiveness, abuse of power, or moderate to severe ethnocentrism (AFM 36-2236 2003; Ting-Toomey 1999). For example, in the current orientation briefs, military members are taught about Islam and the beliefs/differences of Sunni and Shi'a Muslims. When asked, several junior-ranking Marines and soldiers were surprised to see varying degrees of Islam practiced and also had difficulty understanding how secularism fit in with being a Muslim. Some did not understand that religion could be used as a tool or mobilizing factor to further personal or political interests. They also assumed that if Iraqis were not praying five times a day, they must be "a bad Muslim" (TCMEF 2004). Some training programs brief one or two slides on identity concepts or discuss quick overviews of religious beliefs. In addition, culture is treated only as customs and courtesies. According to the surveys and interviews, when asked what was the biggest surprise from what was taught to what they experienced, answers showed "either-or" assumptions which relate to the lower levels of learning (AFM 36-2236 2003; TCMEF 2004). These examples illustrate why we have to teach more than just explaining simplistic, knowledge level information about culture and the operational environment.

A crucial aspect of training according to the level of learning required for SO missions are the learning strategies employed. Learning strategies or teaching methods are the various methodologies used to engage and train an individual to the appropriate levels of learning (Clark 2000; AFM 36-2236 2003; Kearsley 2005). There are a variety of teaching methods; the most common is the informal lecture or briefing by a subject matter expert accompanied by PowerPoint presentations. The drawback to this strategy is because it tends to be used for large military audiences, and because of the overall time constraints for each block of instruction, it limits two-way interaction and only engages part of the audience. Other learning strategies include indirect discourse, reading, self-paced study, questioning, non-directed discussions, guided discussions, practical exercise, cases studies, computer-based training, and multimedia.

Learning theory research highly recommends utilizing a variety of teaching methods in order to cater to individual learning styles and interests (Clark 2000; AFM 36-2236 2003; Kearsley 2005). In addition, research recommends utilizing a common individual learning strategy when presenting material by following these five steps: survey the material to be learned (i.e. an overview), pose questions to be learned, read the material, present key ideas, and then review the material (Kearsley 2005). While this is used typically for individual study, it also has relevance in a pre-deployment training program as a tool for reviewing and presenting material in a short period of time (AFM 36-2236 2003).

The desired level of learning outcome and the learning strategies employed help to order and organize the material to be presented in a way that information is most likely to be processed and retained (Clark 2000; AFM 36-2236 2003; Kearsley 2005). Following the JIPOE template and incorporating CCC training at higher levels of learning, in conjunction with a variety of teaching methods, allows the material to be presented in accordance with traditional military operational briefings. The AFM 36-2236 (2003) chart in Appendix C illustrates various teaching methods for associated levels of learning. It should be noted that the chart states some teaching methods are not recommended for various levels of learning; however, AFM 36-2236 (2003) goes on to state it is possible to attain a higher level of learning with particular teaching methods, provided a variety of strategies are used, depending on the audience aptitudes and motivation, and the audience size. In addition, it does not mention multimedia and computer-based training. These methods help at the comprehension and application cognitive levels, respond to phenomena in the affective domain, and provide for guided response or mechanisms at the psychomotor level of learning (Clark 2000). Using a pre-deployment training program in conjunction with realistic training scenarios, simulations, and exercises, will help to train at the synthesis and adaptation levels, which are associated with the cognitive and psychomotor levels of learning (Clark 2000).

One final note on learning strategies, it is recommended that if providing reading lists or current events, it would be important to provide military relevant analysis, synopsis of the books being recommended, an explanation as to why those books were selected, as well as reference lists associated with each of the training modules. This not

only forces accountability for the material being presented, it also tailors it to the military audience, enables a military member to understand the diverse academic arguments that are taking place, and stimulates the critical thinking skills needed for SO. Carefully planned learning experiences using a variety of learning strategies, at the desired level of learning, based on the mission and audience, facilitate the use of critical analysis skills and adaptability needed at the tactical levels in the SO environment.

The thesis so far has reviewed the social science literature, military doctrine, and DoD related initiatives in order to provide a conceptualization of culture that is based on the military's mission and operational needs; yet, tied to empirical research. It also recommended a systems approach when analyzing the operational environment. In addition, it discussed what is missing in current pre-deployment programs. Given a better understanding of educational levels of learning and learning strategies, the next chapter discusses an empirically and doctrinally-based framework to teach military members operating in a SO environment. The next chapter also discusses the specifics of cultural awareness and cross-cultural communications training, and provides the JIPOE template organized into basic, intermediate, and advanced training level outlines.

V. AN EMPIRICALLY-BASED PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING TEMPLATE

A. AN EMPIRICALLY-BASED PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING PROGRAM AND TEMPLATE

So how should an empirically-based pre-deployment training program be designed that is geared towards the range of military options, yet detailed enough for the most complex missions? This section outlines the framework of the pre-deployment training program and discusses the intent of the program, suggested timelines, program design, and evaluation considerations. This sets up the context for the next two sections which discuss the details for the proposed JIPOE template.

The proposed program is intended to be a multi-pronged, multi-disciplined, empirically, doctrinally, and educationally based pre-deployment training program designed for a greater range of military operations than the traditional JIPB process or current orientation programs allow. This pre-deployment training program would utilize the JIPOE template and include cross-cultural communication training. The framework and template are based on a review of the social science theoretical debates, current doctrine, and the training programs mentioned earlier. They are also based on current discussions taking place in the academic and military communities, initial trend analysis of over seventy OIF military member interviews and surveys, and a review of what was taught in the Naval Postgraduate School's Regional Security Studies program. In addition, the framework and template are interpreted given critical analytical skills honed through twelve years of operational experience as an intelligence officer; training through two social science master degree programs; over 1,500 hours of adult teaching experience and its associated educational training requirements; participating as part of the faculty for two of the previously mentioned training programs; and participating as a member of the audience in one orientation program.

The framework and template incorporates the social science, doctrine, and current initiatives research. Based on the research, the framework and template are designed using a proposed systems conceptualization of culture as the foundation. The pre-deployment training program takes into account the military's range of missions found in

stability operations, and dynamics found in those operational environments. The pre-deployment training program is designed to be scaled or tailored, depending on the mission and rolls of the deploying units/individuals and audience composition (such as age, degree background, familiarity with the region, ranks, etc.). The template has flexibility built into it because it is designed for three training levels: basic, intermediate, and advanced. There is also flexibility within each training level to tailor it to the appropriate levels of learning. Various learning strategies would be employed to enable higher levels of learning at the intermediate and advanced levels of training. The proposed program provides for standardization of instruction and is tied to military needs, which makes it easier to integrate into the operations processes and tempo upon deployment. At the same time, it allows for the information to be accurate, timely, and relevant given the military's operational demands and decision-making processes which occur daily within the operational environment.

The proposed basic, intermediate, and advanced templates are designed to provide the needed cross-cultural communication and operational environmental training. Not all of the basic, intermediate, and advanced levels have to be taught to the same level of learning. As the Air Force ISD training manual points out, "Efficient, effective teaching should be directed at levels that are neither higher nor lower than those appropriate for the desired learning outcomes" (AFM 36-2236 2003, 124). This means that the mission and operational impact of the indigenous population should determine the required levels of learning. These will, in-turn, drive the various learning strategies and media used for each module of instruction. This does not mean having to wait to the last minute to build the training modules. It is possible to review the range of missions and main military geographic areas of interest and build the majority of the training modules from those priorities. As units are preparing to deploy, they are then able to then tailor the overall training program to meet their needs.

Besides organizing the framework and templates to meet military needs, another reason for the proposed structure and content is that not all instructors, professors, or subject matter experts are versed in learning theory or how to teach to higher levels of learning in a concise and concrete way. They may also not be as familiar with the military's organizational culture and how to translate academic concepts and current

events into military-relevant information. By having an empirically- and doctrinally-based structured template and framework that is designed to train to the higher levels of learning, it enables learner-centered training and not just subjective or preference-based teacher-oriented topical presentations. Breaking up a JIPOE template into basic, intermediate, and advanced levels, and tailoring the level of learning to the mission and audience, provides flexibility and training that is relevant for the military audience.

What is the minimum required time needed for an effective pre-deployment training program? Many of current programs are one to five days and typically train at the knowledge level, and depending on the program, some comprehension level. Actual training hours range from four to twenty hours, depending on the training program. Learning theory research states a longer timeline is required to train to higher levels of learning (Clark 2000; AFM 36-2236 2003; Kearsley 2005). Based on the research and the key training considerations mentioned previously, an initial recommendation is that the pre-deployment training would be one to three weeks. The basic level would remain one week and could utilize different learning strategies to obtain appropriate levels of learning for what is taught. The intermediate level of training would be two weeks. The advanced level would be two and a half to three weeks. These timelines are especially important if most members do not have regional experience, expertise, or language training. The timelines can be adjusted if other teaching methods are employed in conjunction with the main training modules. For example, if using computer-based training and simulations or scenario-based exercises, it may be possible to shorten the intermediate and advanced training level timelines. More research is needed by curricula developers and pre-deployment training teams (PDTs) to assess this proposed timeline.

What are some of the other design and evaluation considerations to factor in for this pre-deployment training program? To ensure it is meeting individual and unit military needs, it of course should be vetted through respective training and education commands or higher level operational commands. In order to avoid analytical or personal bias, review and training program development should be conducted by a group of subject matter experts, referred to earlier as PDTs. The PDT(s) should be made up of a variety of experts to include a minimum of political science, anthropology, psychology, education, and military intelligence specialists. The team(s) should have someone with

experience in languages; extensive personal experience or academic training in the operational environments being presented; knowledge of military doctrine, theory, and tactics; as well as learning theory and curricula development. The team(s) should be versed in cross-cultural communications and be able to tailor their examples and information to a military audience. In addition, they should have a critical analysis process in place to review the historical and conceptual depth of the social science literature and open source news and information resources. This will reduce analytical bias and ensure the material they present is up-to-date.

To ensure the material presented to the military audience is as objective as possible, the PDT(s) should utilize peer-reviewed and networking processes. This would entail tapping into available academic, intelligence, and other agencies or professional and educational organizations, and their subject matter experts, to present various training modules and review the PDT(s) materials and sources. The networking and a peer-review process are intended to be another method of minimizing analytical bias, as well as increase the audience's level of learning. Ideally, the PDT(s) would also establish a feedback process. This could include contact with personnel in the operational environment, other agencies and think tank analysts, as well as the planning, intelligence, and influence operations personnel preparing to deploy. The feedback process would also solicit input and feedback from individuals going through the training program, and from individuals returning from deployment. Analysis and incorporation of the feedback and the networking into a pre-deployment training program would enable the material to be tailored to the individuals and unit needs. The diverse networking and feedback systems would provide PDT(s) with a standardized, empirically-based, peer-reviewed, objective methodology and framework from which to train today's military. It would also enable the military to successfully operate within the SASO and "strategic sergeant" realities.

A key component of the JIPOE template is to generate the appropriate level of cultural awareness needed for the SO environment and various missions. Higher educational levels of learning, associated learning strategies, and the mentioned framework and template design considerations are all part of the solution. Another component is generating cultural awareness through cross-cultural communications training.

B. CROSS-CULTURAL COMMUNICATION

Given the impact on the military mission and operational dynamics, how do we minimize culture shock, stereotypes, racism, ethnocentrism, and mirror-imaging issues for military members? The following quotes from surveys of returning Marines noted common perceptions that Iraqis were all liars and dishonest, lazy, or that they were like children (especially in regards to security force training).

They (the Iraqis) also are realizing that their culture is way behind the rest of the world and needs to take a few lessons from western culture...Iraqis were a very passionate and emotional people. No sense of urgency; generally lazy by western standards. Completely subservient people, they exercised no initiative or decision making capability...Very comfortable with graft and corruption...No respect for safety or the environment...Nice to you, then turn around to shoot you the next day...You can't tell if they like you or not. They act like it, then you think they want your help, but then catch them setting up an IED...Never underestimate the Iraqis, they are misleading...Don't trust them...No sense of duty...Iraqis are closed minded (TCMEF 2004).

These comments were made by younger enlisted members who only had minimal to no cross-cultural communications training. As mentioned previously when discussing educational levels of learning, initial trend analysis of the incomplete survey and interview dataset suggest a rough correlation between the ethnocentric and stereotypical comments and the amount of CCC training they received (Ting-Toomey 1999; Weaver 2000; Klein 2004; Weaver 2005). The initial analysis also suggests that some of the general orientation training given today does not provide the correct tools for acculturation and adaptation in a foreign environment. Two exemptions to this are the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Political Military Analysis Handbook (2004) and the Joint Special Operations University's Cross-Cultural Communication Course (2005). They have actually incorporated the CCC social science research into their programs. However, there is no research comparing the outcome of their training programs with others. In addition, there is no CCC doctrinal or training standard for all pre-deployment programs.

What CCC training is appropriate for the military audience? Working in SO environments, it is crucial that every member operating in a foreign environment has a clear understanding of the mission, the objectives, their operations, their biases, and the

cultural impact of their actions (Klein 2004; McFarland 2005, McFate 2005, Sargent 2005). Geary Weaver (2000) notes as long as we remain within our own culture/environment, we take it for granted. However, when we interact with people from other backgrounds, we become more consciously aware of our own culture and identity. Our own way of life then becomes more important to us and it is used to evaluate and categorize others. Knowledge, skills, and attitudes learned in cross-cultural communication or conflict-resolution training will help to generate awareness, provide knowledge, and reduce some of the prejudices and uncertainty that generate stereotypes, hostility leading to abuse of power, and ethnocentrism (Ting-Toomey 1999; Weaver 2000; Weaver 2005; Klein 2004).

Research suggests one approach to cultural awareness is discussing our own culture first and then placing it into context by comparison with another culture (Kohls 1984; Peace Corps HB 1997; Ting-Toomey 1999; Weaver 1999; Weaver 2000; Sue and Sue 2003; DuPraw and Axner 2004; Klein 2004; McFarland 2005). This is generally accomplished by teaching definitions, concepts, and going over the dimensions associated with various cross-cultural communications templates (Peace Corps HB 1997; Ting-Toomey 1999; Weaver 2000; Klein 2004). For example, the Peace Corps Handbook (1997) states the building blocks of culture are based on four concepts: the concept of the self, personal vs. societal obligations, time, and the locus of control. DuPraw and Axner (2004) list six cross-cultural communication challenges to address and overcome: different communications styles, different attitudes toward conflict, different approaches to completing tasks, different decision-making styles, different attitudes toward disclosure, and different approaches to knowing.

Helen Klein (2004) uses eight dimensions in her “Cultural Lens Model” in efforts to help facilitate cognitive cultural awareness: Time Horizon, Achievement vs. Relationship, Mastery vs. Fatalism, Tolerance for Uncertainty, Power Distance, Hypothetical vs. Concrete Reasoning, Attribution, and Differentiation vs. Dialectical Reasoning. Stella Ting-Toomey (1999) discusses identity and relational based themes of individual versus collective orientations using eight identity domains, a discussion of value orientations, as well as verbal and non-verbal communication styles. In addition, she provides tools for communication adaptability and awareness of basic biases and

mindsets that lead to negative stereotypes and ethnocentric actions. Social scientist Gary Weaver (2000) integrates many of the different categories that sociologists and anthropologists use to look at another culture by placing them into eight categories: characteristics of culture, social structure, philosophic outlook, psychological orientation, thought patterns, basic values, perception, and interaction. Each category contains the general “building blocks” for that category; and each building block is meant to be analyzed, and compared or contrasted, based on a continuum and not “either-or” absolutes.

So which of the models are appropriate for the military? Based on the different needs of the military audience and their level of interaction or impact on a local population, Klein’s (2004) model and Weaver’s (2000) model would work best. Klein’s (2004) model can be utilized at the basic level, when just general orientation and awareness is needed. Klein’s model looks at the U.S. culture and then places it in context of another culture. In addition, a discussion and military-relevant illustrations of stereotypes and ethnocentric thinking should be included.

When individuals and units will have more indigenous interaction or more impact on the overall operational environment, then a higher degree of knowledge, skills, and attitudes are required, in which case Weaver’s (2004) model should be utilized. Weaver’s model also provides a social science model that looks at culture as a system and ties it into the other dynamics of the operational environment. Once again the categories of analysis and their associated “building blocks” should be placed in context of the military mindset and U.S. culture, and contrast it with the operational environment being looked at. It should also be geared towards the military audience and provide military-relevant illustrations and solutions. The intent is to present the concepts and some illustrations in the CCC module of instruction. In addition, these concepts and illustrations will also be highlighted throughout the JIPOE template at the intermediate and advanced levels. As McFarland (2005) notes, the goal is to create “culturally literate soldiers” through competency and awareness. His article also provides an excellent starting point for determining the various levels of learning. The intent of CCC training is illustrated in the comments from a returning Marine officer (who had received CCC training):

The longer I worked with Iraqis and they were able to see the intentions of not only myself but my unit and the coalition, they were much more willing to be forthcoming...After about one month on ground I was able to immerse myself in the aspects of my job. It took a while to get past the shock of the environment and the awe of the differences. Once I started my base of knowledge I was able to build on it everyday. Once the Iraqis saw my willingness to learn about and understand their culture, they were more willing to work with me and convince others to work as well (TCMEF 2004).

The next three sections detail the JIPOE templates at the basic, intermediate, and advanced levels. The templates provide an analytical way to assess and teach about an operational environment, based on social science research and military needs. The templates are broken down into training modules covering the dynamics related to the current situation and mission, geography, society, politics, economics, the military, paramilitary, and security forces, history, and cross-cultural communications training.

C. BASIC LEVEL JIPOE TEMPLATE

- Current Situation and Mission
- Conceptualization of the Operational Environment
- Broad Country Orientation
 - *Keep this tailored to mission relevant aspects of each topic*
- Geography / Terrain
 - *May or may not want to include this – can leave it to Intel to do*
 - National / Regional / Local AOR intro – towns, cities, rural areas, big picture look
- History
 - Overview
 - Historical ties impacting or influencing current situation
- Regional Issues
 - Interests in influences of other foreign powers
- Demographics & Societal Look
- Transportation
- Religion

- Continuum of beliefs
 - Concepts of war
 - Significant Religious and Historical Dates
- Economics
- Political and Military Overview
- Contentious Politics / Opposition Continuum
 - Threats / Local Issues / Narratives
 - *Based on mission and unit location*
- Views of U.S. and Use of Media / PA Issues / IO Concerns
 - *If not covered by PA and Ops/Intel folks*
- Protocol / Customs and Courtesies
 - *This sections depends on deploying location of support personnel, they may or may not need this*
 - Greetings
 - Gestures and Hand Signs
 - Visiting
 - Negotiations and Business
 - Displays of Affection
 - Gifts
 - Expectations
 - Do's and Don'ts
 - Clothing
 - Diet
 - Monuments and Historical Buildings / Sites Overview
 - Names (*if needed*)
- Cross Cultural Communication
 - Motivation: Why Study and Historical Examples of Failures
 - Modified Klein's Cultural Lens Model
 - Identity (similarities and differences)
 - Time Horizon
 - Achievement vs. Relationship
 - Locus of Control
 - Tolerance for Uncertainty

- Power Distance
- Hypothetical vs. Concrete Reasoning
- Attribution (Root Cause vs. Systems Approach)
- Differentiation vs. Dialectical Reasoning
- Ethnocentrism Issues and Examples and How Impacts Mission
 - Placed in context of unit deployment location and mission
 - Placed in context of problem solving issues: problem definition, planning, prediction, coordination, and training
 - Military relevant solutions
 - Short vs. Long term goals and needs
 - Discuss U.S. versus local interests
- Initial Language Basics (*if needed*)
 - *Related to mission duties*
- Sources and Resources

D. INTERMEDIATE LEVEL JIPOE TEMPLATE

- Current Situation and Mission
- Conceptualization of the Operational Environment
- Introduction General Geographic Orientation and Overview
 - Location and size
 - Physical features
 - Climate
 - Political Geography (Overview)
- Social Organization and Dynamics
 - Density and Distribution of Population/Demographic Groups
 - Population Analysis
 - Urban / Rural
 - Race
 - Ethnic
 - Language
 - Socio-Economic Class
 - Political Parties
 - Age
 - Social Structure and Organization
 - Explain structures and hierarchies
 - Family/clan/tribe/lifestyle/etc.

- Associations / Unions
 - Ideologies
 - Education System
 - General conditions and issues
 - Philosophy on role of education by senior leaders
 - Politicization of education
- Public Health
 - Organization
 - General conditions or issues
- Religion
 - General info and trends
 - Continuum of beliefs
 - How does it mix with political ideology and the current political system
 - How much influence does it have in the way of life
 - To what extent is it unifying or divisive
 - How similar or different from our understanding of religion
 - Basic history / understanding
 - Funeral and burial practices
 - Impact on our mission
 - Overlaps and splits within social organization and dynamics of country
- Economic Organization and Dynamics
 - Principal Economic Ideology
 - Compare similarities and differences with U.S
 - Property Issues / Tax Issues
 - Authorities, rates, rate determination, accountability, corruption issues
 - Compare similarities and differences with U.S.
 - Economic Infrastructure
 - Mode, forces, and means of production
 - Institutions and ties to government or elites
 - Lines of communication (overview and region specific)
 - Services (overview and region specific)
 - Comparison with region
 - Economic Performance
 - GNP, GDP, FTB, PCI, Inflation, Annual Growth,
 - Productive segments
 - Foreign investment and trade patterns
 - Employment/Unemployment and Skills Assessment and Resources

- Education, sufficiency, technical, professional, liberal arts, shortages, groups feeling excluded
- Economic Benefit and Distribution
 - Economic power sources
 - Occurrence and distribution of poverty and wealth (concentration and dispersal of)
 - Ownership patterns
 - Informal economy issues (use of black market and its impact on population)
- Population Shifts or Issues
- Analysis of Economic Programs and Resources
 - Roles of NGOs
 - Ways to influence or generate favorable support, stabilize neutral groups or threats
- Natural Resources and Uses
 - Rentier government and impact on population
 - Foreign interests and use of resources
 - Other Economic Dependency Issues
- Political Organization and Dynamics
 - Formal Governmental Political Structure
 - Mechanisms for Rule/Elections at National, Regional, Local Levels
 - Sources of Power
 - Informal Political Structure
 - Legitimacy of Government
 - Legal and Illegal Political Parties
 - Alliances and coalitions
 - Contentious issues
 - Interests
 - Nonparty / Associations / Organizations
 - Motivating issues, strengths, ideology, platform, alliances
 - Law and Justice
 - System of laws
 - Administration of justice
 - Media Analysis
 - Independence or control by government, elites, or opposition
 - Methods of dissemination of opinion and information

- Impact on U.S. mission (*this could be moved to current events section at the end*)
- What Government Services are Vital to Mission Success
- Detailed Analysis of Opposition Groups
 - History and narratives
 - Degree of inclusion or exclusion
 - Desired goals, beliefs, perspectives, ideology, political rhetoric, interests
 - Degree of support
 - Capabilities and marketing/framing resonance
 - Methods of influence / symbols used to justify or support goals/beliefs
 - Community ties
 - Divisions/Factions within group(s)
 - Opposed by / Opposes
 - What leaders and elites?
 - What groups?
 - Resources
 - Organizational and operational patterns, shifts, trends
 - Doctrine
 - Recruitment
 - Funding
 - Logistical support
 - Alliances
 - Use of geographic or urban areas
 - Strengths / Weaknesses
 - Influencing or Co-option by U.S. and Consequent Management Discussion
- Analysis of Key Leaders (Government, Elite, Opposition Groups)
 - Type of leader
 - Management style
 - Decision-making style
 - Authority, legitimacy, ability for coercive use of force
 - Allied with / Opposes / threats to his/her interests
 - Beliefs, motivations, interests
 - How and when did person/people come to power
 - Strengths and weaknesses
 - How viewed in the organization
 - How perceived of in population
- Analysis of Administration / Bureaucracy
 - Which elements or structures of government functioning well or poorly and why

- Analysis of Political Programs or Resources that Might Generate Favorable Support, Stabilize Neutral Groups or Neutralize Potential Threats
 - Elites
 - What are their interests in current situation
 - How do they exert pressure, influence, power
 - Relationship with government or opposition groups
 - What functions do they perform
 - Regional Issues
 - Foreign policy interests
 - Regional neighbor interests in current situation
 - What are direct and indirect influences in the country
 - Impact of displaced persons
- Military or Paramilitary and/or Security Force Organization and Dynamics
 - Roles
 - Organization
 - Ranks, uniforms, and insignia
 - Size
 - Leadership and Loyalties, Alliances, Interests
 - Division or Oppositional Issues within the Military
 - Relation with Government and Economic Impact/Influence in Society
 - Capabilities
 - Societal Views of Military / Security Forces / Paramilitary Forces
 - Quality of Life, Training, and Education
 - Strengths and Vulnerabilities
 - Weapons and equipment
 - Role of Organized Crime and Ties to Military or Security
 - Issues or Concerns When Working with Military and/or Security Forces
 - Impact on Current Situation
- Historical Dynamics and Analysis
 - Social History
 - Religious History
 - Economic History

- Trends and consequences in attempts to shift or reform
- Political History
 - Timelines
 - Key events
 - What are the threads of continuity in the state's history
 - History of political violence or coups
 - Impacts/significance on current events
- Military, Paramilitary, Security History
- Historical Narratives of Various Groups
 - *Focus on those impacting military mission or current situation*
- Historical Images and Messages Providing Framing Resonance with Groups or the Population
- Historical Understandings and Key Events
 - What are the historical ties of current political and social issues
 - What are the historic geographic factors impacting current events
- Use of History for Education and Socialization
 - How might it impact mission
- Use of History by Regime and Perceptions of Legitimacy by Population
 - How might it impact mission
- Collective Memory
 - Events and milestones that have shaped current psyche
 - Prevailing Historical Heroes and Myths
 - What are the Important Historical Ideals
- Cross Cultural Communication
 - *Some of this may be incorporated into other areas*
 - Motivation: Why Study and Historical Examples of Failures
 - Ethnocentrism Issues and Examples and How Impacts Mission
 - Explain and provide examples of mindsets and attribution errors
 - *Placed in context of unit deployment location and mission*
 - *Placed in context of problem solving issues: problem definition, planning, prediction, coordination, and training*
 - Discuss military relevant solutions
 - Weaver's CCC Comparison
 - Similarities and Differences of U.S. vs. Other

- *Explained in Terms of Continuums*
- *Explain academic debates*
- *Ensure understand there are no absolutes*
- Characteristic Culture
 - Abstractive - Associative
 - *Gesellschaft - Gemeinschaft*
 - Society - Community
 - Urban - Rural
 - Apollonian - Dionysian
 - Heterogeneous - Homogeneous
- Social Structure
 - Individualistic - Collective
 - Small or nuclear family - Extended Family
 - Overt social rules - Implicit social rules
 - Loose in-group/out-group distinction - Rigid in-group/out-group distinction
 - Achieved or earned status - Ascribed status
 - Flexible roles - Rigid roles
 - Loosely integrated - Highly integrated
 - Class - Caste
 - Social and physical mobility - Little social or physical mobility
 - Low power distance - High power distance
- Philosophic Outlook
 - Mastery or control over nature - Harmony with or subjugation to nature
 - Melodramatic/escapist - Tragic/realistic
 - Humane/inhuman - Human/inhumane
 - Objective - Subjective
 - Quantitative - Qualitative
 - Alloplastic - Autoplasic
 - Mind/body dichotomy - Union of mind and body
- Psychological Orientation
 - Psychology of abundance - Psychology of scarcity
 - Schizoid or fragmented - Comprehensive or holistic
 - Need for achievement - Need for affiliation
 - Abstractive and logical - Anthropomorphic & complexive
 - Masculine - Feminine
 - Direct responsibility - Indirect responsibility
 - Great use of extensions - Little use of extensions
 - Extension transference - No extension transference
 - Steep pleasure gradient - Flat pleasure gradient

- Weak uncertainty avoidance - Strong uncertainty avoidance
 - Guilt-internal - Shame-external
- Thought Patterns
 - Analytic - Relational
 - Theoretical learning and knowledge - Experiential or kinesthetic learning and knowledge
 - Dichotomous/divisions - Holistic/joining together
 - Linear-separations - Nonlinear-comprehensive
 - Abstractions/prose - Imagery/poetry
- Basic Values
 - Doing - Being
 - Change/action - Stability/harmony
 - What/content - How/style
 - Individualism - Belongingness
 - Independence - Interdependence/dependence
 - Self-reliance - Reliance upon others
- Perception
 - Mind/body dichotomy - Mind and body are one
 - Monochronic time/action - Polychronic time/action
 - Linear or segmented time - Nonlinear or comprehensive time
 - Future orientation - Past or present orientation
 - Space/objects separated - Continuity of space/objects
 - Subject-object - Subject-subject
 - Nonsensual and non-senseful - Sensual and senseful
- Interaction
 - Low-context - High-context
 - Competition - Cooperation
 - Verbal emphasis - Nonverbal and verbal
 - Written or electronic - Face-to-face
 - Impersonal - Personal
 - Schizoid/fragmented relationships - Holistic/interdependent relationships
 - Monological - Dialogical
 - Practical/aloof - Nonpurposive/involved
 - Easy to break action chains - Difficult to break action Chains
 - Systematic - Spontaneous
- Protocol / Customs and Courtesies
 - Greetings
 - Gestures and hand signs
 - Visiting

- Negotiations and business
 - Displays of affection
 - Dating and marriage
 - Gifts
 - Expectations / Do's and Don'ts
 - Clothing
 - Food/Diet/Eating
 - Work and recreation
 - Monuments and Historical Buildings / Sites Overview
 - Names (if needed)
 - Negotiation Training (*as needed*)
- Language Basics (*as needed*)
 - Keep it focused to mission needs
- Current Events Discussion
 - Views of U.S. and Use of Media / PA Issues / IO Concerns
 - Explain potential mission impact
 - Short vs. Long Term Goals and Needs (U.S. vs. Government vs. Locals)
 - Explain potential mission impact
 - Least to Most Likely Potential Scenarios
 - Given the mission and events taking place
- Sources and Resources

E. ADVANCED LEVEL JIPOE TEMPLATE

- Intermediate Level JIPOE Template
- Seminar / Panel Discussions / Scenario Discussions on Strategic Analytical Issues, Impact on Mission, 2nd and 3rd Order Effects and Consequence Management
 - Strategic Issues and Analysis
 - Civil Military Relations Concepts and Frameworks and Debates
 - Comparative Politics Concepts and Frameworks and Debates
 - International Relations Concepts and Frameworks and Debates
 - Political Economy Concepts and Frameworks and Debates
 - Use of Violence
 - Tactics (reasons for use, suicide bombings)
 - Spiral and desensitization

- Discriminate vs. indiscriminate use and effects
- Use of religion
- Motivating interests
- Historical Analysis and Debates
 - Post conflict and reconstruction issues and concerns
 - Nation building issues and concerns
 - Democracy debates
 - Colonial era lessons learned
 - Building legitimacy and the local level
- Counterinsurgency Concepts / Frameworks / Debates
- Modernization / Globalization and Impact on Identity Development
- Religion and Political Ideology
- Media and IO and Influence Issues
- Current Events and Situation Dynamics
 - Planning assumptions
 - Political objectives versus U.S. interests versus political and military realities
 - Effects based operations and measures of effectiveness assessment in context of operational environment dynamics

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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This thesis covered a lot of material in order to provide an empirically-based pre-deployment training program that trains to a higher level of learning and proficiency needed for units conducting stability operations and confronting today's "strategic sergeant" environment. The thesis reviewed the social science literature, ranging from political science, anthropology, cross-cultural communications, and psychology, to educational learning theories. In addition, military joint and service doctrine, current DoD initiatives, current pre-deployment training programs and documents, and the raw data from surveys and interviews with Marine and Army personnel were also reviewed. The purpose was to discuss two interrelated issues. The first over-arching issue was how to define, conceptualize, and analyze the operational environment. In order to answer that, we first had to discuss the other issue, which was how to define, conceptualize and analyze culture in a way that was tied to the social science body of knowledge and could be used by the military.

There are numerous theoretical debates when analyzing how and why a society or nation does what it does. The same is true when attempting to define, conceptualize, and analyze culture. The debates are tied to the social science schools of thought or lenses used, ranging from rational-choice and post-modern theories to constructivist theories. Each theory has its explanatory value as well as its empirical limitations. While a certain theory cannot be definitively proven, taking a multi-theoretical and multi-disciplined approach provides for greater explanatory power. A multi-dimensional approach becomes crucial because as one instrument of national power, the military is required to operate in foreign environments in order to achieve and maintain our national security interests. A multi-disciplined and multi-theoretical approach enables the military to operationalize the social science theories into a framework and methodology that can be used to analyze, train, and function within the operational environment.

Systems Theory focuses on the complexity and interdependence of relationships and provides a framework from which to analyze various units within the context of its natural environment. Therefore, the answer to both issues is to consider both culture and

the operational environment as systems. As was discussed, culture is actually a dynamic and interdependent aspect of any operational environment. Both culture and the operational environment have varying units of analysis and variables that are at play, depending on the context of the situation and the scope of the mission.

In this thesis, I proposed that the DoD conceptualize culture as a system because it has fluid, dynamic, interrelated, and independent parts, rather than considering culture to be inherently static, deterministic, or exceptional. Culture operates at several levels ranging from cognitive and behavioral elements at the micro-, meso-, and macro-level to relational processes at the meso- and macro-levels. Culture includes the more observable outer layers (such as traditions, customs, behavior, structures, outcomes) to the increasingly difficult to grasp cognitive and affective inner layers (such as assumptions, values, feelings, beliefs, narratives, perceptions). Culture manifests itself in systems and institutions as well as behavioral patterns, symbols, and artifacts.

I have argued the way to analyze culture within the operational environment is to utilize cross-cultural communications training (CCC). CCC is needed because the military culture itself stresses certain mindsets (such as the socialization process to achieve the warrior ethos and ability to fight) that unless acknowledged and recognized, can produce degrees of ethnocentrism and culture shock which can lead to stereotypes and racism or alienation of an indigenous population. Not only does CCC generate awareness of one's own biases and assumptions about "the other," which helps to minimize stereotypes, generalizations, and culture shock, it also compares and contrasts the dynamics of the operational environment with American culture using various categories of analysis based on a continuum of interests or concepts. A systems approach to analyzing the operational environment is to look at the current situation and the military mission in the context of geography, society, politics, economics, the military, paramilitary, and security forces, and historical dynamics; in addition to cross-cultural communications training.

In addition, I discussed what is missing in current pre-deployment programs, the appropriate educational levels of learning, and the learning strategies required for greater proficiency in stability operations. Finally, in order to align empirical and doctrinal

analysis with the operational realities, I provided a framework and a tailored JIPOE template at the basic, intermediate, and advanced levels to be used by pre-deployment training teams when training military members for missions across the range of military operations.

What recommendations need to be made and what are areas for further research? Doctrine needs to be updated to reflect the realities of stability operations and homeland security, since these missions require greater proficiency than traditional major combat operations. Pre-deployment training teams should be formed either within the current training programs or within the operational or training commands. This is because the services lack a vetting process or even an empirically-based template for analyzing the operational environment during the pre-deployment training cycle. They need to begin developing the right mix of multi-media and diverse learning strategies, as well as determine the baseline levels of learning for each training module in the JIPOE template. In addition, more research is needed by curricula developers and the pre-deployment training teams to assess the proposed timelines. One other area of research ought to be testing the JIPOE template to see if there is empirically a noticeable increase in the knowledge, skills, and attitudes of members going through the training. Finally, the proposed JIPOE framework and template need to be tied into the longer-term education and training initiatives being discussed and implemented by the DoD. Especially since the proposed initiative impacts doctrine, operations, intelligence, education, and manpower requirements.

Analysis of the operational environment and culture using the systems approach built into the JIPOE template allows us to adapt, acculturate, establish relationships and influence in order to meet mission requirements. It prepares military members to operate at a higher level of operational effectiveness, which SO and the “strategic sergeant” informational environment require. A systems approach towards culture and the operational environment, applied to pre-deployment training, and linked with long-term education and training or regional expertise and language proficiency initiatives, will improve the military’s ability to operate successfully across the range of military missions.

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APPENDIX A

The Four-Step JIPB Process

(From: Joint Publications (JP) 2-01.3. May 2000. *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace*. Retrieved online 15 January 2005 from <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine>)





Figure II-2. Process for Step One of Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

PROCESS FOR STEP TWO OF JOINT INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE



DESCRIBE THE BATTLESPACE'S EFFECTS

1. Analyze the battlespace environment
 - a. Analyze the military aspects of each dimension
 - b. Evaluate the effects of each battlespace dimension on military operations
2. Describe the battlespace's effects on adversary and friendly capabilities and broad courses of action

Figure II-3. Process for Step Two of Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

PROCESS FOR STEP THREE OF JOINT INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE

EVALUATE THE ADVERSARY

1. Identify adversary centers of gravity
2. Update or create adversary models
3. Determine the current adversary situation
4. Identify adversary capabilities





Figure II-17. Process for Step Three of Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

PROCESS FOR STEP FOUR OF JOINT INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE

DETERMINE ADVERSARY COURSES OF ACTION



1. Identify the adversary's likely objectives and desired end state
2. Identify the full set of courses of action available to the adversary
3. Evaluate and prioritize each course of action
4. Develop each course of action in the amount of detail time allows
5. Identify initial collection requirements

Figure II-21. Process for Step Four of Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace


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APPENDIX B

Educational Levels of Learning

(From: Air Force Manual 36-2236. 2003. *Guidebook for Air Force Instructors*. Washington D.C.: AFDPO and HQ AETC/ED, 30-33)

Figure 2.1. Levels of Knowledge and Understanding.



L I N E	A	B
	Level of Learning	Definition
1	Knowledge	Recall previously learned material (facts, theories, etc.) in essentially the same form as taught.
2	Comprehension	See relationships, concepts, and abstractions beyond the simple remembering of material. Typically involves translating, interpreting, and estimating future trends.
3	Application	Use learned intellectual material in new and realistic situations, including the application of rules, methods, concepts, principles, laws, and theories.
4	Analysis	Break down material into its component parts so that the organizational structure may be understood, including the identification of the parts, analysis of the relationships between parts, and recognition of the organizational principles involved.
5	Synthesis	Put parts together to form new patterns or structures, such as a unique communication (a theme or speech), a plan of operations (a research proposal), or a set of abstract relations (schemes for classifying information).
6	Evaluation	Judge the value of material for a given purpose. Learning in this area is the highest in the cognitive hierarchy because it involves elements of all the other categories, plus conscious value judgments based on clearly defined criteria.

Figure 2.2. Levels of Attitude and Values.





Figure 2.3. Levels of Skill.



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APPENDIX C

Educational Learning Strategies

(From: Air Force Manual 36-2236. 2003. *Guidebook for Air Force Instructors*. Washington D.C.: AFDPO and HQ AETC/ED, 33 and 209)

Figure 3.2. Comparison of Taxonomies of Learning Outcomes.

Types of Learning	Cognitive Taxonomy (AFMAN 36-2236, Table 3.1.)	Types of Learning (AFH 36-2235, Volume 10, Table 3.2.)	Air Force Proficiency Code Subject Knowledge (Figure 3.1.)	Air Force Proficiency Code Task Knowledge (Figure 3.1.)
Remembering	Knowledge	Forming Associations Forming Chains Making Discriminations	Facts	Nomenclature Procedures
Reasoning	Comprehension	Making Classifications	Principles	Operating Principles
Problem Solving	Application Analysis Synthesis Evaluation	Using Rules Problem Solving	Analysis Evaluation	Complete Theory

Table 19.1. Teaching Methods Grid or Decision Table.

Factor	Presentational Methods					Student Verbal-Interaction Methods			Application Methods				
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M
I T E M		Lecture (Formal, Informal Briefing, Student Speech)	Indirect Discourse (Panel Discussion, Dialogue, Teaching Interview)	Demonstration-Performance (Coaching, Tutoring, Operation of Equipment or Systems)	Reading (Books, Periodicals, Microforms, Manuals, Handouts)	Self-Paced (Programmed, Modular, Computer-Assisted, Mediated)	Questioning (Socratic Method, Student Query)	Nondirected Discussion (Peer-Controlled Seminar, Free Discussion)	Guided Discussion (Instructor Controlled)	Practical Exercises-Individual Projects	Practical Exercises-Field Trips	Practical Exercises-Experiential (Learner Development Games)	Case Studies
DOMAINS AND LEVELS													
1 Cognitive: Knowledge	HR	r	nr	HR	HR	nr	nr	nr	r	r	nr	nr	
2 Comprehension	r	HR	nr	r	HR	HR	nr	HR	r	nr	r	r	
3 Higher Levels	nr	ar	nr	nr	r	r	nr	nr	HR	nr	HR	HR	
FACTORS AND CONSTRAINTS													
8 Minimum Level of Instructor Expertise	c	h	h	h	h	h	na	h	h	c	h	h	
9 Class Size	lg	lg	sm	indiv	indiv	sm	sm	sm	indiv	sm	sm	sm	
10 Evaluation Inherent in Method	no	no	yes	no	yes	yes	no	no	yes	no	yes	yes	
11 Responsive to Individual Needs	no	no	Yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	

NOTE: The key to the items listed in the columns are defined as follows:

HR - highly recommended

r - recommended

nr - not recommended

c - comprehension level (cognitive level)

h - higher level (cognitive taxonomy)

lg - large class

sm - small class

indiv - individual

na - not applicable

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